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"If current predictions of population  growth  prove 
accurate  and patterns of human  activity on  the  planet remain 
unchanged,  science  and  technology may not  be  able  to prevent 
either irreversible  degradation  of  the  environment  or 
continued poverty for much  of the world  . ...  Unrestrained 
resource  consumption  for  energy production  and  other 
uses ...  could lead  to  catastrophic  outcomes  for  the  global 
environment.  Some  of the  environmental  changes  may  produce 
irreversible damage  to the Earth's  capacity to sustain life. 
The  overall pace of environmental  changes  has  unquestionably 
been  accelerated  by  the  recent  expansion  of the  human 
population.  Global  policies are urgently needed  to 
promote  more  rapid economic  development  throughout  the 
world,  more  environmentally  benign  patterns  of human 
activity,  and  a  more  rapid  stabilization  of  world 
population.  The  future of our planet is in the  balance." 
The  Royal  Society,  London,  U.K.,  and  the  U.S.  National 
Academy of Sciences,  1992 
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Norman  Myers 
EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
The  world's  population is undergoing  an  increase  in numbers  that is 
unprecedented  in  scale  and  speed.  The  present  total  of  5.5  billion is 
projected  to  more  than  double  before  it stabilizes  at  zero  growth.  A 
high  projection  indicates it may  well  grow  three  or  even  four  times, 
while  a  low projection shows  it could,  through greatly expanded planning 
efforts,  be  held below  8  billion.  Roughly  nine-tenths  of  future  growth 
will occur in developing nations,  precisely the  nations  least able  to 
accomodate  such  a  large  increase in numbers  in short order. 
These  demographic  projections are merely projections.  They  are not 
predictions,  still less  are  they  forecasts.  Demography  is  not  destiny. 
Projections  are  entirely divorced  from  constraining factors  such  as 
environmental  resources--soils,  water,  vegetation,  climate,  etc.--that 
ultimately  support all economies  and  constitute  a  crucial basis  for 
sustainable development.  There  is  much  evidence  that environmental 
resources  are  being ever-more  rapidly depleted in deyeloping nations  (in 
developed  nations  too),  to  an  extent  that  will  critically  curtail 
economic  advancement.  Much  environmental depletion is  due  to population 
pressures--and this  is all the  more  significant  in  that  economic 
advancement  is  a  key  contribution  to  the  processes  that  lead  to 
1 reductions  in fertility.  Equally  to  the point,  it may  well  be  that 
environmental  degradation will  prove  so  severe  and  pervasive  in certain 
developing  nations  that it will  undercut  the  capacity  for  many  human 
communities  to maintain themselves  even at their present  inadequate 
levels,  resulting in a  rise  in morbidity  and mortality,  and  thus  further 
postponing declines  in fertility.  So  probable  is  this  prospect  that, 
without  immediate  and  far-reaching  changes  in  policy,  the 
population/environment travails of developing nations  today  could likely 
turn out  to be  minor  compared with what  lies ahead. 
But  population/environment  linkages  are  not  so  simple  and 
deterministic  as  is  sometimes  asserted.  A  host  of  other  variables  are 
at work,  notably  the  economic,  social  and political  systems  and  the 
policy  strategies  in developing  nations  concerned,  plus  exogenous 
factors  such  as  aid,  trade  and  debt  relationships  with  developed 
nations.  The  scope  for corrective policy is by no  means  confined to the 
population  and  environment  sectors.  There  is  abundant  opportunity  for 
policy interventions  on many  fronts.  To  date,  however,  policy  responses 
have  been  far  too  limited to  make  much  difference,  due  ostensibly  to 
lack of appreciation of the multiple  dynamic  linkages  between population 
and  environment  in conjunction  with  associated  sectors  of  development. 
This  lack  of  appreciation  is  often  due  to  the  multiplicity  and 
complexity  of  interactions  at  work  within  the  environment/population 
nexus.  It is  difficult  to  demonstrate  specific  cause-and-effect 
linkages  of both exclusive  and conclusive sort.  As  a  result,  absence  of 
evidence  about  the  problem  tends  to  be  taken  as  evidence  of  absence  of 
the  problem.  The  case  goes  by default. 
2 Developed  nations  too  feature  much  environmental  decline, 
especially with respect to ozone-layer depletion and  global warming--two 
superscale  problems  that will  affect nations  throughout  the  world. 
Developed nations  likewise  feature  some  population  growth,  which,  while 
not  nearly  so  great  as  in  developing  nations,  is  nonetheless  a 
significant variable  to be  addressed. 
All this has  profound  implications  for  the  European  Community. 
Because  of  its  manifold  relationships  with  developing  nations,  notably 
environmental  and  economic  relationships,  the  future  of the  Community  is 
intimately  tied in  with  the  future  of  developing  nations.  These 
interdependency  relationships  will  surely  become  more  numerous  and 
significant  in  the  decades  ahead.  The  Community  can  play  a  major  role 
in confronting the  challenges  of  environment  and  population.  It will 
thereby  go  far  to  safeguarding  its  own  long-term  interests--provided it 
comprehends  the  challenges  in their full  scope  and  scale.  Certain of 
the  changes  required will  be  difficult  indeed.  But  they  will  not  be 
nearly  so  difficult as  the  changes  imposed  by  gross  population overload 
and grandscale  environmental  ruin. 
Fortunately the  outlook is not entirely negative.  There  is still 
time,  though  only  just time,  for  imaginative  policy  and  incisive  action 
to  turn  profound  problems  into  exceptional  opportunities.  A number  of 
success  stories  demonstrate  that  with  sufficient  creative 
leadership--which the  European  Community  is well  placed to  supply--we 
can still get  on  top  of many  of  our  problems  before  they  get  on  top  of 
us.  These  success  stories reveal that  in the  main we  know  what  to  do, 
3 the  science  and technology are available,  and  the  required measures  need 
not  always  be  expensive  in  light  of  the  multiple  benefits  generated. 
Indeed  a  radical  reorientation of policy will generally prove  to  be  a 
super-productive  investment  for  both  the  European  Community  and 
developing nations  alike. 
What  is mainly  lacking is  the  political foresight  and  the  policy 
initiatives  to reflect not  only  the  costs  of action but  the  concealed 
costs  of inaction.  Or,  to put it more  constructively,  an  approach  of 
"business  as  usual,  only  more  so  and  better  so"  will entrain profound 
penalties,  whereas  a  seismic  shift  in policy  responses  will  engender 
highly positive payoffs.  On  both the population and  environment  fronts, 
with all they  mean  for  sustainable  development  for  the  international 
community  as  a  whole,  we  face  a  time  of breakdown  or breakthrough.  The 
resources  in  shortest  supply  are  time  and  vision.  The  decades  ahead 
surely  present  the  most  daunting  and  the  most  creative  challenges 
confronting  world  leaders  during  the  whole  course  of  the  human 
enterprise. 
4 Chapter ! 
INTRODUCTION 
"The  environmental  problems  of the  poor will affect  the 
rich  as  well,  in  a  not  too distant  future,  transmitted 
through political instability and turmoil." 
Gro  Harlem  Brundtland,  1986 
The  world is in the middle  of an unprecedented expansion of human 
numbers.  It took  10,000  lifetimes  for  the  world's  population  to  reach 
two  billion people.  Now  in  the  course  of  a  single  lifetime,  it is 
increasing  from  two  billion to  three  times  as  many,  and  within  another 
lifetime it could well double  again. 
The  great bulk of this population upsurge  is  in the  developing 
nations.  There  is  strong  evidence  that  population  pressures  generate 
adverse  repercussions  for  the  environmental  resource  base  that 
ultimately  underpins  much  economic  activity  in  developing  nations. 
Hence  too  the  conclusion that population  growth  harms  the  prospects  for 
economic  advancement  in these nations. 
This will carry profound implications  for  the European Community: 
--First  and  foremost  is  what  might  be  termed  the  "moral 
imperative".  The  Community  has  many  connections  with  the  developing 
nations  by  virtue  of  historical  relationships  reaching  back  for 
centuries.  For  this  reason  alone,  the  Community  bears  a  responsibility 
for  helping  to  reverse  the  widening  divide  between  the  developed  and 
developing  worlds.  In  1900  the  ratio  of  per-capita  income  between 
Western  Europe  and  India  was  2:1,  but  the  gap  has  widened  to  40:1  in 
1965  and  70:1  today.  Since  1980  the  developed  nations  as  a  whole  have 
5 increased  their  average  per-capita  GDP  by  almost  $8000,  whereas  most 
developing nations  have  increased their's  by  only  a  few  hundred  dollars 
at  most--and  many,  notably  those  of  the  Indian  sub-continent,  sub-
Saharan Africa  and  the  Andean  region,  have  experienced  zero  or  even 
negative  growth.  When  Community nations  achieve  an  annual  economic 
growth  rate  of  2  percent,  they  expand  their per-capita  GDP  by  $300;  the 
same  growth  rate  for  leading  developing-world nations  such  as  Nigeria 
results  in  a  per-capita  increase  of  $5.  Similarly,  an  already-affluent 
Community  citizen  grows  richer  each  year  by  an  amount  that  is  twice  as 
large  as  the entire annual  income  of a  least-developed nation citizen. 
Moreover,  the  Community  nations,  in common  with other developed-
world  nations,  engage  in  international  economic  relationships  that  are 
often disadvantageous  to  the  South.  Were  the  Community  to persist with 
these  relationships,  would  it not  deny  certain  responsibilities  of  its 
global  role?  This  is all  the  more  pertinent  insofar  as  the  Community 
should  soon  be  able  to  offer  greater  leadership  in  the  international 
arena. 
--Second,  the  Community  has  a  marked  interest in political 
stability around  the  world.  This  applies  specially with  respect  to 
regional  conflicts  such  as  the  recent  Gulf  War.  If developing  nations 
fail  to  advance  economically,  there  will  be  increasing  scope  for 
outbreaks  of violence. 
--Third,  a  number  of exceptional-value  resources  are at  stake  in 
developing nations.  While  many  of these  resources  fall entirely within 
6 the  sovereign jurisdiction of nations  concerned,  they  rank  as  resources 
of  "global  heritage"  through  their  significance  for  all  humankind--and 
hence  outsider  nations  can  express  a  legitimate  interest  in  their 
status.  These  resources  include,  for  instance,  tropical  forests, 
containing  the  bulk of  the  Earth's  species  and  chief site of  the  mass 
extinction underway;  and,  still more  importantly,  sectors of the Earth's 
atmosphere  and  climate  systems. 
--Fourth is  the  factor of migratory pressures.  We  are  starting to 
witness  a  phenomenon  of  economically  disadvantaged  migrants  from 
the  South,  many  of whom  can  be  regarded  as  environmental  refugees. 
This  phenomenon  is  growing  so  fast  that it may  soon  become  a  prominant 
feature  of  the  international  arena.  Europe  is  already  perceived  as  an 
"escape valve"  for multitudes  of migrants  from  North Africa  who  can 
readily make  the  short passage  across  the Mediterranean. 
--Finally there  are  trading  and  other  commercial  relationships 
between  the  Community  and  developing  nations.  The  South  receives  30 
percent  of  the  Community's  exports  and it supplies  21  percent  of  its 
imports.  Unless  the  South  can  maintain  economic  progress,  the  hope  of 
expanded  trade  will  diminish.  Community  exports  to  developing  nations 
declined during  1982-88,  at  a  cost  of  $171  billion and  with  a  loss  of 
at  least  half  a  million  jobs  (George,  1992).  Moreover,  developing 
nations  owe  much  foreign  debt  to  the  Community  (around  $85  billion in 
1988)  and  there will be  reduced  scope  for  this  debt  to  be  paid off if 
economic  growth in the  South does not expand. 
7 For all these  reasons,  the  Community  has  a  distinct stake  in the 
economic  advancement  of  developing  nations,  and  hence  in  the 
environmental  resource  base  that  sustains  their  economies.  In  certain 
respects,  this  environmental  resource  base  is  more  important  to 
developing-nation  economies  than  is  the  case  for  developed  nations  (for 
details,  see  Appendix  1).  Yet  environmental  resources  in  developing 
nations  tend  to  be  more  susceptible  to  severe  and  often  irreversible 
injury,  as  witness  tropical deforestation,  desertification,  soil erosion 
and  water  deficits.  Moreover,  if  a  developing  nation  finds  its 
environmental-resource  base  is  declining,  it will  generally  have 
difficulty  switching  to  other  economic  activities  if only  because  of 
shortages  of capital investment  and  trained manpower. 
As  noted,  environmental  resources  in  developing  nations  are 
undergoing depletion through population pressures--and thus  the  European 
Community  has  an  interest also  in population factors  in  developing 
nations.  But  the  argument  is  by  no  means  straightforward.  In  many 
instances,  population/environment  linkages  are  far  from  clear  and 
explicit,  let  alone  deterministic  and  predictable.  It  is  not 
necessarily  the  case  that  more  people  must  always  mean  more 
environmental problems  (and in tu~ more  economic  problems).  Many  other 
variables  are  at  work.  They  include  present  population  stocks, 
differentiated rates  and patterns of population growth,  the  distribution 
of  additional  human  numbers,  the  share-out  of  resource  endowments,  the 
types  of  resource  exploitation,  and  ~he  technologies  utilized  for 
exploitation.  Further,  they  embrace  social  and  cultural  factors, 
economic  systems,  political structures,  and policy strategies of nations 
8 concerned.  They  also extend to exogenous  factors  such as  aid,  trade  and 
investment  relationships  with  the  wider world.  Each  of  these  variables 
features  linkages  to  many  if not  most  (sometimes  all)  the  other 
variables,  making  for  a  multiplicity of  dynamic  interactions. 
So  there is no  single linkage  between population and  environment. 
Still less  are  there directly and  exclusively causative  linkages  for  the 
most  part.  Linkages  can  be  both proximate  and  ultimate.  Interactions 
can  be  modulated  by  a  host  of  additional  factors  such  as  socioeconomic 
advancement,  technological  innovation  and  policy  reform  (also  by 
subsidiary  factors  such  as  migration).  Nor  are  the  interactions  always 
two-way.  The  situation is  much  more  complex  than  is  sometimes 
represented  (Harrison,  1992;  Kessler,  1992;  Keyfitz,  1991;  Myers,  1991a). 
Note,  moreover,  that the  phenomenon  of population growth  is by no 
means  a  characteristic of developing nations  alone.  There  is still some 
growth  underway  in most  developed  nations,  including  most  of  the 
European Community.  While  this growth is  small  as  compared with that of 
developing nations,  it is nonetheless  significant in light of the  levels 
of  resource  consumption,  together with  the  technologies  employed  to 
support  consumption,  that characterize  the  European  Community.  While 
developed nations  are  often forthright  in urging that developing nations 
institute vigorous  and  urgent  policies  to  reduce  population  growth  to 
zero  as  soon  as  possible,  they  have  been  noticeably  reluctant  to 
institute parallel  policies  of  their  own.  This  policy  lacuna  deserves 
to  be  addressed in explicit,  comprehensive  and  systematic  fashion.  Not 
a  single Community  nation has  done  that. 
9 Chapter II 
CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK: 
AN  OVERVIEW  OF  POPULATION/ENVIRONMENT  LINKAGES 
1.  Background Perspectives 
"Can  these  (population)  projections  ever materialize, 
knowing that more  than  90  percent of the  population growth 
would  take  place  in  poor  countries  with limited natural 
resources  as  mass  poverty,  ignorance  and  complacency might 
well  lead  to  rising  death  rates.  If we  do  not  get 
population  growth  under  control,  habitat  on  Earth  will  be 
destroyed  by  ecological  disaster  and/or violent  migration 
processes." 
Willy Brandt,  1989 
Global  Population Factors 
Global  population in mid-1992  amounts  to almost  5.5 billion people. 
Of  these,  4.3  billion or  78  percent  are  in developing  nations,  and  1.2 
billion or  22  percent  are  in  developed  nations  (United  Nations 
Population  Division,  1991)  (Table  1).  Some  345  million,  being  6.3 
percent  of  the  global  total  and  almost  29  percent  of  the  developed 
nations'  total,  are  in the  twelve nations of  the  European  Community 
(Table  2).*  The  Community  is far  and  away  the  most  populous  entity in 
the  developed world:  compare  the  United States with  253  million people, 
the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States with  262  million,  and  Japan  with 
124 million. 
* Today  there  are  twelve nations in the  European Community.  If the  five 
additional  nations  that  have  made  application  for  membership  are 
admitted  within  the  next  few  years,  they  will  increase  the  EC's 
population  to  377  million,  and  raise  the  EC's  share  of  the  world's 
population to  7  percent  (of developed nations,  31  percent). 
10 Moreover,  global population is  growing at a  rate of 1.7 percent per 
year,  or  93  million  people  (the  equivalent  of  Germany  and  Netherlands 
combined,  or  four  times  the  whole  of  Scandinavia)  (Table  1).  The  rate 
of annual  increase will peak  in 1998  with  98  million people.  As  we 
shall see  below,  it is this factor,  viz.  the  annual  increase  in absolute 
numbers,  that  is  also  critical  to  nations'  prospects  for  sustainable 
development  (meaning,  broadly,  development  based  upon  a  safeguarded 
environmental-resource  base;  see  box).  Of  the  annual  increase,  more 
than  90  percent  is  in developing nations,  and  over half in Africa  and 
Southern Asia  which  feature  the  majority  of  the  1.2  billion  "poorest  of 
the  poor".  By  definition,  developing  nations  have  limited  capacity  to 
cope  with  the  environmental  and  economic  consequences  of  ultra-rapid 
growth  in  human  numbers,  due  to  their  low  per-capita  incomes, 
unproductive  agriculture,  poor  infrastructure,  meagre  technology  and 
inadequate  investment  (Tables  3  and  4). 
The  latest projections  (United Nations  Population Division,  1991; 
World  Bank,  1992)  indicate that  the  global  total will  reach  6.3  billion 
people  by  the  year  2000  and 8.6 billion by  2025,  before levelling out at 
a  total of 11.6 billion by  2100  or shortly thereafter.  Of  the projected 
increase  from  1991 till 2025,  3.2 billion,  94  percent will  occur  in 
developing nations. 
Note,  moreover,  that  the  11.6 billion figure  for  the  2100  global 
total is the  medium-level  projection.  The  high projection indicates 
the  total  could attain 14.2  billion  (and  even  20.7  billion by  2150), 
while  the  low  projection  indicates  it could  be  held  as  low  as  7.9 
11 DEFINITIONS  OF  SUSTAINABLE  DEVELOPMENT 
"Sustainable development  is development  that meets  the needs  of the 
present  without  compromising  the  ability  of  future  generations  to  meet 
their own  needs ...  Living  standards  that  go  beyond  the  basic  minimum  are 
sustainable  only  if consumption  standards  everywhere  have  regard  for 
long-term sustainability." 
World  Commission  on  Environment  and Development,  1987, 
Our  Common  Future,  Oxford University Press,  Oxford, 
U.K. 
"Sustainable  development ...  involves  providing  a  bequest  to  the next 
generation which is at least equal  to that  inherited by  the  current 
generation." 
D.W.  Pearce et al.,  1989,  Blueprint for A Green  Economy, 
Earthscan Publications Ltd.,  London,  U.K. 
"Sustainable  development  distributes  the  benefits  of  economic 
progress more  equitably,  protects both local and  global environments  for 
future  generations,  and truly improves  the quality of life." 
Inter-American Development  Bank,  1990,  Our  Own  Agenda, 
Inter-American Development  Bank,  Washington D.C.,  U.S.A. 
"Sustainable development means  improving  the  quality of human  life 
while  living within  the  carrying capacity of  supporting  ecosystems.  A 
"sustainable  economy"  maintains  its natural  resource  base.  It can 
continue  to  develop  by  adapting,  ~nd through  improvements  in knowledge, 
organization,  technical efficiency,  and wisdom." 
IUCN,  UNEP  and  WWF,  1991,  Caring for the Earth:  ~  Strategy 
for Sustainable Living,  Earthscan Publications Ltd.,  London,  U.K. 
"A  sustainable  society is not necessarily  the  same  as  a  zero  growth 
society.  That  concept  is  as  primitive  as  that  of  perpetual  growth. 
Rather  a  sustainable  society will discriminate  among  kinds  of  growth,  -
and  purposes  of  growth.  It will  ask  what  growth  is  for,  who  will 
benefit,  what it will cost,  how  long it will last,  and whether it can be 
accomodated  by  the  sources  and  sinks  of  the  Earth.  That  is  to  say,  a 
sustainable  society  will  be  less  interested  in  growth  than  in 
development ....  To  grow  means  to increase  in size by  the assimilation or 
accretion  of  materials.  To  develop  means  to  expand  or  realize  the 
potentialities of;  to bring to  a  fuller,  greater,  or better state.  When 
something  grows  it gets quantitatively bigger;  when  it developes it gets 
qualitatively better." 
D.H.  Meadows  et al.,  1992,  Beyond  the  Limits,  Earthscan 
Publications,  London,  U.K. billion (and  even 5.6 billion by  2150).  The  difference between  the high 
and  low  projections  for  2100,  6.3  billion,  is  to  be  compared  with 
today's  total of  5.5 billion--and it serves  as  a  graphic  measure  of  the 
maneuvering  room  still available. 
Specially significant is  the  situation of 1.2  billion absolutely 
impoverished  people  in developing nations,  these  being  the  people  who 
(a)  most  need  the  benefits  of  development,  (b)  often  cause  a 
disproportionate  amount  of  environmental  degradation,  and  (c)  feature 
the highest  fertility rates  (World  Bank,  1991).  While  their percentage 
share of total numbers,  now  22  percent,  is  likely to decline,  their 
absolute  numbers  are projected to keep  on  increasing  (in  the  absence  of 
vigorous  remedial  measures)  for  several decades  of  the  next  century 
(World  Bank,  1991). 
We  should note,  morever,  that all these  demographic  projections are 
no  more  than  extrapolations  of  recent  trends,  together  with  some 
assumptions  about  the  role  of  economic  advancement  and  family  planning 
in  stemming  the  rate  of  population  growth.  Projections  are  not 
predictions,  still less are  they forecasts.  By  their nature,  they  take 
no  account  of  other variables  such  as  policy  changes  and  technological 
breakthroughs.  Nor  do  they  reflect  environmental  factors:  they  assume 
there will be  no  Malthusian constraints.  But  as  we  shall  see  below,  the 
fast-growing  degradation  of  the  environmental-resource  base  that 
ultimately  supports  all  communities  may  soon  start  to  exert  a  markedly 
constraining effect  on population  growth.  Given  the  record of the  last 
two  decades,  it becomes  increasingly hard to  see  how  sub-Saharan Africa, 
12 for  example,  will experience  a  projected quadrupling  of human  numbers 
within  another  century  as  long  as  gross  environmental  impoverishment . 
continues  to  spread with  the  impact  of  the  recent  past:  per-capita 
incomes  are  generally no higher than in 1960,  and per-capita  food  supply 
is  20  percent  less.  Those  who  consider that population  growth  may  soon 
be  pressing  against  or  even  exceed  "carrying  capacity"  (an  important 
concept  to  be  considered  shortly)  are  inclined  to  be  increasingly 
sceptical  about  demographic  projections  made  in  an  "environmental 
vacuum". 
A  further  dimension  to  this  demographic  background  impinges 
significantly  on  environmental  questions.  It is  the  distribution  of 
population,  especially the  fast-growing  shift  from  rural  to  urban  areas 
in developing  nations  where  the  urban  population  is  projected  to 
increase  from 1.3 billion to 2.3 billion,  a  77-percent  expansion,  during 
just the next 15  years  (United Nations  Population Division,  1991).  This 
urban  increase--stemming  in  major  measure  from  population 
growth--engenders  acute  shortages  of  many  basic  requirements  for 
acceptable  living standards,  including  supplies  of water,  sanitation, 
food,  energy,  housing  and  sheer  space.  Huge  congregations  of  urban 
communities  are  obliged to  subsist  in  shantytowns  and  other  slum-type 
settlements  that  are  characterized  by  extreme  squalor  and  deprivation. 
It is  projected  that  by  the  year  2025,  three-fifths  of  humankind  will 
be  living  in urban  areas;  and  of  these,  between  one  third and  one  half 
will be  in developing-nation  shantytowns~ 
13 Population in the European Community 
As  noted,  there  is little population  growth  in  the  European 
Community  (Table  2).  While  it comprises  the  most  populous  political 
entity in the  developed world with  345  million people,  the  population 
growth  rates  of its  member  nations  range  from  a  mere  0.6  percent  per 
year  in Ireland  to  -0.1  percent  in  Germany,  with  an  average  of 
0.2  percent.  Its  annual  rate  of  natural  increase  (not  counting 
immigration)  is  around  700,000  people.  Natural  growth  rates  appear  to 
be  slowing  still further  in most  nations,  though  a  few  nations  such  as 
France,  Germany  and Italy are  seeking to increase fertility. 
But  the  Community's  citizens  enjoy  advanced  levels  of  affluence. 
Per-capita  GNP  averages  more  than  $14,000,  or 19  times  greater  than  the 
developing  nations'  average.  Moreover  the  technology  deployed  to 
generate  this  affluence  often has  harmful  effects  on  the  environment. 
So  even a  small  amount  of population growth can exert a  powerful  impact. 
Consider  energy  consumption  in the  case  of Britain.  British people 
consume  energy,  mostly  in  the  form  of  fossil  fuels,  equivalent  on 
average  to  35  barrels of oil per year.  While Britain's population of  58 
million has  a  natural  growth  rate  of  only  0.2  percent  per  year,  this 
still means  an  additional  116,000  people  per  year,  worth  energy 
consumption  equivalent  to  4  million  barrels  of  oil.  An  average 
Bangladeshi  consumes  energy,  mostly  in  forms  other  than  fossil  fuels, 
equivalent to  3  barrels of oil per year.  Bangladesh's population of 120 
million people  features  an annual  growth rate of 2.4 percent,  meaning  an 
additional  2.9  million people  per  year--worth  energy  consumption 
equivalent to 8.7 million barrels of oil.  So  Britain,  with only half as 
14 many  people  as  Bangladesh  and  a  population  growth  rate  a  mere  one 
twelfth as  large,  produces  almost half as  much  extra  carbon  dioxide  for 
the  global  atmosphere  each year  as  does  Bangladesh  through  population 
growth  alone.  Britain's  population  growth  rate  plays  a  far  more 
significant  role,  by  proportion,  in  global  warming  processes  than  does 
Bangladesh's--yet  Bangladesh  is  likely  to  suffer  far  more  severely  from 
global warming  than Britain. 
Population Growth  and  Economic  Growth 
Population growth  can be  detrimental  to  economic  growth  in direct 
fashion  as  well  as  through  its  indirect  impact  via  environmental 
degradation  (Daly  and  Cobb,  1989;  Keyfitz,  1989;  McNamara,  1991).  But 
as  yet there is no  strong concensus  of expert opinion on all the  precise 
linkages  at work.  A nation with  an  annual  economic  growth  rate  of  5 
percent  and  a  population  growth  rate  of  2.5  percent  loses half of its 
per-capita economic  advance  to population growth.  But  there  is  more  to 
the  situation  (Repetto,  1987).  Provided population  growth  is not  too 
large  and not  too  fast,  it can  sometimes  contribute  to  the  expansion  of 
domestic  markets  and  other  econo~ies  of  scale  (Demeny,  1989;  Kelley, 
1988).  Similarly,  population  pressures  can,  in  certain  circumstances, 
engender  institutional change  and  technological  innovation  that  might 
not  otherwise  occur,  through  e.g.  intensification  of  agricultural 
systems  (Boserup,  1981).  But  in many  parts  of  the  Indian  sub-continent 
and  sub-Saharan Africa,  population  growth  has  led  to  such  fragmentation 
of  agricultural  smallholdings,  with  inadequate  product  surplus  for 
farmers  to  invest  in  improved  agriculture,  that  intensification has  not 
15 advanced  nearly  fast  enough  to  keep  up  with  population  growth.  Still, 
multiple  variables  in agriculture  remain  significant  (Dreze  and  Sen, 
1989).  China has  only half as  much  cropland per person  as  India,  yet 
India suffers widespread and persistent hunger while China  does  not. 
A number  of related questions  arise.  Can  we  suppose  that under 
given  sets  of  circumstances,  slower  population  growth  would  necessarily 
increase per-capita  income  through  greater per-capita availability of 
resources,  both  renewable  and  exhaustible?  Would  it relieve  pollution 
and  other  forms  of  environmental  degradation?  Would  it enhance  levels 
of  schooling and health,  worker productivity,  and  labour absorption into 
the  modern  sector?  How  far is there  a  causative  connection  between 
population  growth  and  poverty--and  is it comprehensive  or  only partial? 
Does  it work  in both directions--if,  in some  cases at least,  population 
growth  leads  to  or  exacerbates  poverty  (in  conjunction  with  other 
contributory factors),  does  it mean  that  a  slowing  of population  growth 
will necessarily go  some  way  to relieving poverty?  If that is true,  can 
we  achieve  more  by  slowing population growth than by other measures  such 
as  policy change,  institutional initiatives,  and  improved  technologies? 
The  issue has  been  summarized  by  the  World  Bank  (1984):  "Policies 
to  reduce  population  growth  can  make  an  important  contribution  to 
development  (especially  in  the  long  run),  but  their  beneficial  effects 
will  be  greatly  diminished  if they  are  not  supported  by  the  right 
macroeconomic  and  sectoral  policies.  At  the  same  time,  failure  to 
address  the  population problem will  itself reduce  the  macroeconomic  and 
sectoral policies that are possible,  and  permanently  foreclose  some 
16 long-run  development  options."  Regrettably  this  statement,  like most 
conventional  economic  analysis,  takes  no  account  of  the  crucial 
dimension of environmental  factors. 
Carrying Capacity 
Certain observers,  often ecologists,  assert that carrying capacity 
is  not  only  a  key  constraint  to  population  growth,  but  that it can 
readily  become  an  absolute  factor.  Other  observers,  often economists, 
assert  that it is  such  a  flexible  affair,  subject  to  endless  expansion 
through  technology  and policy interventions,  that it soon  ceases  to have 
much  operational value at all. 
Carrying capacity can be  defined as  "the number  of people  that  the 
planet can support without  irreversibly reducing its capacity to  support 
people  in the  future"  (Ehrlich et al.,  1989;  see  also  Daly  and  Cobb, 
1989;  Keyfitz,  1990;  Pimentel  and  Pimentel,  1989).  While  this is  a 
global-level  definition,  it applies  at  national  level  too,  albeit  with 
many  qualifications  as  concerns  international relationships  of  trade, 
investment,  etc.  It is  a  highly  complex  affair,  being  a  function  of 
factors  that reflect  food  and  energy supplies,  ecosystem services  (such 
as  provision  of  freshwater  and  recycling  of  nutrients),  human  capital, 
people's  lifestyles,  social  institutions,  political  structures  and 
cultural  constraints  among  many  other  factors,  all  of  which  interact 
with  each  other.  Particularly  important  are  two  points:  carrying 
capacity  is  ultimately  determined  by  the  component  that  yields  the 
lowest  capacity;  and  human  communities  must  live  off  the  "interest"  of 
environmental  resources  rather than off their  "principle"  (Ehrlich et 
17 al.,  1989). 
Thus  the  concept  of carrying capacity is closely tied in with the 
concept  of  sustainable  development  (see  below).  There  is  much  evidence 
that  human  numbers  with  their  consumption  of  resources,  plus  the 
technologies  deployed  to  supply  that  consumption,  are  often exceeding 
carrying  capacity  already.  Consider  a  specific  example,  food 
production.  The  World  Hunger  Project  (Chen  et  al.,  1990),  has 
calculated  that  the  planetary  ecosystem  could,  with  present 
agrotechnologies  and  with  equal  distribution of  food  supplies, 
sustainably  support  no  more  than  5.5  billion people  even if they  all 
lived  off  a  vegetarian  diet--and  the  1992  global  population  is  already 
5.5 billion.  If humans  derived 15  percent of their calories  from animal 
products,  as  do  many  people  in South America,  the  total would  decline to 
3.7 billion.  If they  gained  25  percent  of their calories  from  animal 
protein,  as  is  the  case  with  most  people  in North  America,  the  Earth 
could support  only 2.8 billion people. 
True,  these  calculations  reflect  no  more  than  today's  food-
production  technologies.  Some  observers  protest  that  such  an  analysis 
under-estimates  the  scope  for  technological  expertise  to  keep  on 
expanding  the Earth's carrying capacity.  We  can  surely hope  that many 
advances  in agrotechnologies  are still available  to  come  on  stream.  But 
consider the  population/food  record over  the  past  four  decades.  From 
1950  to 1984,  and  thanks  largely  to  remarkable  breakthroughs  in Green 
Revolution  agriculture,  there  was  a  2.6-fold  increase  in world  grain 
output.  This  achievement,  representing an  average  increase  of  almost  3-
18 percent  per  year,  raised per-capita  production  by  more  than  one  third. 
But  from  1985  to  1992  there has  been far  less  annual  increase,  even 
though  the  period  has  seen  the  world's  farmers  investing  billions  of 
dollars  to  increase  output,  supported  by  the  incentive  of  rising  grain 
prices  and  the  restoration to  production  of  idled  U.S.  cropland.  Crop 
yields  have  "plateaued";  it appears  that plant  breeders  and  agronomists 
have  (temporarily?)  exhausted  the  scope  for  technological  innovation. 
So  the  1991  harvest  has  been little higher  than  that of 1984.  Meantime 
there  are  an  extra  600  million  people  to  feed.  While  world  population 
has  increased by  almost  13  percent,  grain output per person has  declined 
by nearly  7  percent  (for elaboration of  the  analytic  methodology,  see 
Brown  et al.,  1990;  and  for  a  brief  review  of  carrying  capacity with 
respect  to  food-production  potential  in  the  case  of  Kenya,  see 
Appendix 2). 
Environment  and Sustainable Development 
As  is now  widely  recognized  (Daly  and  Cobb,  1989;  Goodland  et al., 
1991;  Pearce  et al.,  1989  and  1991;  World  Commission  on  Environment  and 
Development,  1987),  economic  growth is  by  no  means  to  be  equated with 
sustainable  development  (see  box  for  definitions  of  sustainable 
development).  Apart  from  the  fact  that  development  connotes  many 
processes  that  are  non-economic  in nature  (social  and  cultural 
development,  for  example),  much  economic  growth  of  the  recent  past  is 
clearly  not  sustainable  for  environmental  reasons  alone.  This,  in 
conjunction with  the  linkages  between· environmental degradation and 
population growth,  alters  the  development  outlook  profoundly.  It may 
well turn out  that we  have  achieved  economic  advancement  in the past at 
19 a  cost  to  the  future's  capacity  to  supply still more  advancement--and 
even at the more  serious  cost of an actual decline  in human  welfare. 
Consider again  the  case  of Green  Revolution agriculture,  which 
enabled  growth  in grain production to  keep  ahead  of  growth  in human 
numbers  throughout  the  period  1950  to  1984.  There  appear  to  have  been 
certain covert costs,  in the  form  of overloading of croplands  leading to 
e.g.  soil  erosion,  depletion  of  natural  nutrients,  and  salinization  of 
irrigation  systems.  These  costs,  while  unnoticed  or  disregarded  for 
decades,  are  now  levying  a  price  in  terms  of  cropland productivity.  In 
Pakistan,  at  least  32,000  square  kilometers  of  irrigated  lands  (20 
percent),  and  in India  200,000  square  kilometers  (36  percent),  are  so 
salinized that  they have  lost much  of their productivity.  Yet  these  two 
countries  have  often been  proclaimed  as  prime  exponents  of  Green 
Revolution agriculture. 
In fact,  environmental constraints of several sorts are now  causing 
significant cutbacks  in food production at a  time  when  population growth 
continues  with  insufficient restraint.  Soil  erosion  leads  to  an  annual 
loss  in  grain output  estimated at  9  million  tonnes;  salinization  and 
water  logging of irrigated lands,  1  million tonnes;  and  a  combination of 
soil compaction,  loss  of organic matter,  and  a  number  of  other  factors, 
2  million tonnes.  The  total  from  these  forms  of  land  degradation is 12 
million tonnes.  In addition there are various  types  of damage  to crops: 
air pollution is  estimated  to  be  worth  1  million tonnes  of  grain output 
foregone  each year,  and  flooding,  acid  rain and  increased ultraviolet 
radiation,  another 1  million tonnes  (Brown  et al., 1990). 
20 So  the  total from all forms  of environmental degradation comes  to 
14  million  tonnes  of  grain  output  per  year.  This  total  is  to  be 
compared with gains  from  increased investments  in irrigation,  fertilizer 
and  other  inputs,  worth  29  million  tonnes  per  year.  Thus  environmental 
factors  are  now  causing  the  loss  of  almost  half  of  all  gains  from 
technology-based  and  other  advances  in  agriculture.  This  is  a  loss  we 
can all the  less  afford insofar as  we  need  an  additional  28  million 
tonnes  of  grain  output  each  year  just  to  cater  for  the  needs  of 
population  growth  (let  alone  the  demands  of  economic  advancement  and 
enhanced diets).  While  the  net  gain in grain output  is  now  about  1.0 
percent  each  year,  population  growth  is  1.7  percent  (Brown  et al., 
1992). 
It is  apparent,  then,  that  there  are  multiple  sets  of  dynamic 
interactions  between  population  growth  and  environmental  deterioration 
(Ehrlich and Ehrlich,  1990;  Harrison,  1992;  Keyfitz,  1989  and  1991; 
Myers,  1991a;  Tabah,  1992).  Both  are  central  to  the  cause  of 
sustainable  development.  That  much  is generally accepted.  But  in terms 
of critical linkages,  the picture is less clear cut. 
21 2.  Critical Linkages 
"The  srage  is being  ser  for  one  of rhe  grearest  human 
rragedies  of all  rimes.  The  desrruction  of renewable 
resources in rhe  developing world poses  a  threar as great to 
the  human  furure  as  rhe  prospecr of nuclear war." 
Maurice  F.  Strong,  1987 
~ Basic  Equation 
Consider first  some  central  factors  of population  growth  and  its 
impacts.  We  can identify four principal components:  P,  being population 
itself,  I  being  environmental  impact,  C  being  per-capita  consumption 
(determined  by  income  and  lifestyle),  and  T  being  environmentally 
harmful  technology that  supplies  C  (amended  from  Ehrlich  and  Ehrlich, 
1990;  see  also  Davis  et al.,  1989).  The  three  factors  P,  C  and  T 
interact in multiplicative  fashion,  i.e.  they  compound  each other's 
impacts.  So  whatever  the  size of C  and  T,  the  role  of  P  is  bound  to  be 
significant  even when  a  population,  its  growth  rate  too,  are  relatively 
small.  According to this analysis,  we  can conclude  that for any  type  of 
technology,  for  any  given  level  of  consumption  or  waste,  for  any  given 
level  of  poverty  or  inequality,  the  more  people  there  are,  the  greater 
is  the  overall  impact  on  the  environment.  We  can  represent  the 
processes  involved in the  form of a  basic equation,  I  = PCT  (Ehrlich and 
Ehrlich,  1990). 
This  equation  demonstrates  why  developing nations,  with  large 
populations but  limited.economic  advancement,  can generate  a  vast  impact 
on  the  environment  if only  because  tne  P  multiplier  on  the  C  and  T 
factors  is  so  large.  For  an  indication of how  this  applies  to  China, 
see  Appendix  3.  Likewise  the  equation  makes  clear  that  developed 
22 nations  also  generate  population  impacts  insofar  as  the  A  and  T 
multipliers  for  each person are  exceptionally  large.  For  an  indication 
of how  this  applies  to  the European Community  nations,  see Appendix  4. 
A number  of other factors  are at work  besides  the  three  elements  of 
the  equation.  They  include  socioeconomic  inequities,  cultural 
constraints,  government  policies,  and  the  international  economic  order, 
to cite  but  a  few  (Tables  3  and  4).  Moreover  these  additional  factors 
vary greatly  throughout  the  global  community  of almost  200  nations, 
disparate  as  they  are  in  agroclimatic  zones,  natural  resource 
endowments,  historical traditions  and  the  like.  But  sooner or later all 
these  additional  factors  operate  through  one  or  another  of  the 
equation's three variables. 
To  illustrate how  the equation's  interactions work,  suppose  that, 
by  dint  of  exceptional  effort,  humankind  managed  to  reduce  the  average 
per-capita consumption of environmental  resources  (C  in the  equation)  by 
5  percent;  and  to  improve  its  technologies  (T)  so  that  they  caused  5 
percent  less  environmental  injury  on  average.  This  would  reduce  the 
total  impact  (!)  of  humanity  by  roughly  10  percent.  But  unless  global 
population  growth  (P)  were  restrained at  the  same  time,  it would  bring 
the  total  impact  back  to  the  previous  level  within  less  than  6  years 
(Ehrlich and Ehrlich,  1990). 
All this applies notably to population growth  on  the  part of  a 
particular  sector of  humankind,  the  one  billion people  who  live  in 
absolute  poverty.  Their  impoverished  status  and  their  large  numbers 
23 serve  to aggravate  their environmental  impact,  and  again  the  linkages 
operate  in multiplicative  fashion,  each  one  reinforcing  the  other. 
Moreover,  these  people  tend  to  feature  the  highest  population  growth 
rates.  Of  the poorest one  fifth of developing-nation households,  between 
55  and  80  percent have  eight or more  members,  whereas  at national  level 
the  proportion  is  only  15  to  30  percent  (Lipton,  1985;  see  also  Sadik, 
1992).  In addition,  these  peopie  are unusually  dependent  for  their 
survival  upon  the  environmental-resource  base  of  soil,  water,  forests, 
fisheries  and biotas  that make  up  their main  stocks  of economic  capital. 
At  the  same  time,  they  see  scant  alternative  to  exploiting  their 
environmental-resource  base  at  a  rate  they  recognize  is  unsustainable: 
they  experience  unusually  short  "time  preference"  rates,  meaning  they 
feel obliged to mis-use  and over-use their resource  stocks  today even at 
cost  to  their prospects  tomorrow.  They  thereby  undercut  their principal 
means  of livelihood--thus entrenching their poverty  (Kates  and Haarmann, 
1991;  Little and Horowitz,  1987;  Mink,  1991).  In turn,  this appears  to 
reinforce their motivation  to have  large  families  (Keyfitz,  1990).  As 
upshot,  they  face  the prospect of ever-tightening constraints. 
These  people's plight also  reflects  the  failure  of development  in 
general.  They  have  been bypassed  by  the  usual  forms  of  development, 
notably  Green  Revolution  agriculture:  they  cannot  afford  costly  inputs 
such  as  high-yielding  seeds,  fertilizer,  irrigation and  farm  machinery. 
So  they  become  "marginalized".  They  are marginalized too  in that  they 
generally lack economic,  political,  legal or social status,  meaning  they 
can do  little to  remedy  their plight.  All too often this drives  them  to 
seek  their  livelihood  in  environments  that  are  unsuitable  for 
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there  is  the  phenomenon  of  the  impoverished  peasant  who  causes 
deforestation,  desertification  and  soil  erosion  on  a  wide  scale:  the 
marginal  person  in marginal  environments.  In  developing  countries  as  a 
whole,  these  "bottom  billion"  people  may  sometimes  cause  environmental 
injury  as  great  as  that  of  the  other  three  billion people  (Kates  and 
Haarmann,  1991). 
In  short,  far  from  enjoying  the  development  benefits  that would 
ostensibly  push  them  through  a  demographic  transition  to  smaller 
families,  these  people  are  caught  in a  demographic  trap.  Given  their 
severely constrained circumstances,  population  growth  denies  them  the 
very  inducements  that  could  serve  to  reduce  population  growth  (Keyfitz, 
1990). 
Socioeconomic  Infrastructure 
A  further  linkage is relevant.  It is the  capacity of governments 
to  cope  with  the  processes  involved  (population  growth,  increased 
consumerism  and  technology  expansion),  i.e.  to  plan  for  them  and 
otherwise  accommodate  them.  This  reflects  a  host  of  government 
activities:  political responses,  policy  interventions,  institutional 
initiatives,  promotion of technology  advances,  and  a  host of measures  to 
establish socioeconomic  infrastructure. 
It is  a  planning  challenge  unprecedented  in its character  and 
extent.  No  societies  in the  past  have  had  to  cater  for  population 
growth at annual  rates of  2  percent or  more  for  decades  on  end,  let 
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sizeable  number  of nations  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  the  Muslim  world. 
Indeed it would  tax the  planning capacities  of  the  most  sophisticated 
and  established societies.  Yet  is is  a  challenge  confronting nations 
that  often have  experience  of  only  a  few  decades  of nationhood  and  the 
modern  state organization.  Moreover many  developing nations are further 
constrained  by  exogenous  factors  such  as  adverse  trade  relations, 
inadequate  and  often  inequitable  aid  flows,  and  foreign  debt.  In  these 
circumstances it is  remarkable  that  so  many  developing nations  have 
achieved  so  much  in such a  short period. 
North-South Relationships 
Certain North/South  relationships,  and notably  the  Community's 
relationships  with  developing  nations,  serve  to  exacerbate  problems  of 
population and  environment  (Ramphal,  1992).  They  thus  act  as  ultimate, 
by contrast with proximate,  factors--a  somewhat  covert dimension that is 
often  overlooked  (Shaw,  1989).  Consider  two  such  relationships, 
external debt  and international trade. 
Developing nations  owe  $1.2  trillion of outstanding loans  from 
developed nations.  This  debt  burden  weighs  heavily  on  developing-nation 
prospects  for  development  generally  (George,  1992;  O'Neill,  1990),  and 
on  environment  and  population  concerns  in particular.  It has  induced 
governments  to  over-exploit  resource  stocks  such  as  tropical  forests  in 
order  to  generate  immediate,  albeit  unsustainable,  revenues  (Weaver, 
1991).  It has  obliged  many  poorer  nations  to  cut  back  on  their 
government  spending  on health and  family  planning activities,  and has 
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Philippines,  India,  Tunisia,  Morocco,  Colombia  and  Costa  Rica  (United 
Nations  Population  Fund,  1990).  It can  even  be  demonstrated  to  be 
causing  the  deaths  of half a  million children each year  through  general 
slowing  or  even  reversal  of  development  processes  in  developing 
countries  generally  (UNICEF,  1990),  with all that implies  for population 
planning prospects. 
Next,  international trade  and its adverse  impact  on environmental 
concerns.  Agricultural  trade  protectionism  on  the  part  of  developed 
nations  in Western  Europe,  North  America  and  the  Pacific  entails  the 
outlay  of  $200  billion  a  year  to  protect  domestic  agriculture.  The 
policy  militates  against  agricultural  exports  from  developing  nations, 
depriving  them  of trade  revenues  worth  $30  billion a  year  (Winglee, 
1989;  Zietz  and Valdes,  1986).  In turn,  these direct  losses  reduce 
developing-country  farmers'  profits,  leaving  them  less  money  to  invest 
in  upgraded  agriculture  and  thus  perpetuating  poverty.  In  turn  again, 
they  ultimately  induce  poor  farmers  to  overload  their  croplands  and  to 
cultivate marginal  lands. 
Environmental Discontinuities 
Growth  in human  numbers,  in conjunction with  growth  in human 
consumption  and  growth  in environmentally  adverse  technology  (the  I  = 
PCT  equation),  serves  to  build  up  a  situation  that  can  eventually 
generate  an  "overshoot"  outcome.  In turn,  this  outcome  can  precipitate 
a  downturn  in  the  capacity  of  environmental  resources  to  sustain human 
communities  at  their  erstwhile  level--a  phenomenon  known  as  an 
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occurs  when  ecosystems  have  absorbed  stresses  over  long  periods  without 
much  outward sign of damage,  then eventually reach a  disruption level at 
which  the  cumulative  consequences  of  stress  reveal  themselves  in 
critical proportions  (an  example  is acid rain).  We  should anticipate 
that as  human  communities  continue  to expand in numbers,  they will exert 
increasing pressures  on  already  over-burdened  ecosystems  and  natural-
resource  stocks,  whereupon  environmental  discontinuities  will  surely 
become  more  common  (Myers,  1992a). 
An  instance has  arisen in the Philippines where  the agricultural 
frontier  closed  in  the  lowlands  during  the  1970s.  As  a  result, 
multitudes  of  landless  people  started to  migrate  into  the  uplands, 
leading to  a  buildup of human  numbers  at a  rate far greater than that of 
national population growth.  The  uplands  contain the  country's  main 
remaining  stocks  of forests,  and  they  feature  much  sloping  land.  The 
result has  been a  marked  increase  in deforestation and  a  rapid spread of 
soil  erosion  (Myers,  1988).  In  other  words,  there  occurred  a 
"breakpoint"  in patterns  of  human  settlement  and  environmental 
degradation.  As  long  as  the  lowlands  were  less  than  fully  occupied,  it 
made  little difference to the  uplands  whether there was  50  percent or 10 
percent  space  left. It was  only when  hardly  any  space  at all was  left 
that the  situation altered radically.  What  had  seemed  acceptable  became 
critical--and the profound shift occurred in a  very  short  space  of time. 
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This  problem of  land  shortages  is  becoming  widespread  in many  if 
not  most  developing  countries,  where  land  provides  the  livelihood  for 
almost  60  percent  of  populations  and  where  most  of  the  most  fertile  and 
most  accessible  land  has  already  been  taken.  During  the  1960s,  arable 
areas  were  expanding  at  roughly  0.5  percent  per  year.  But  during  the 
1980s  the  rate  dropped  to  only  half  as  much;  and  primarily  because  of 
population  growth,  the  amount  of per-capita arable  land  declined  by  1.9 
percent per year  (United Nations  Population Fund,  1990).  Similarly,  the 
annual  expansion of  irrigated lands,  which  supply  one  third of  our  food 
from  one  sixth of croplands,  fell by half during  the  same  period. 
For details of other environmental discontinuities  in the offing, 
relating to e.g.  deforestation,  fuelwood deficits and  fisheries  decline, 
see Appendix 5. 
All  the  environment/population issues  examined  so  far  relate 
primarily  to  developing  nations.  Hence  they  are  of  only  indirect 
interest to  developed nations.  But  much  environmental  degradation, 
notably  global  warming  and  ozone-layer  depletion,  affects  the  entire 
global community,  and it does  so  directly--these being problems  that are 
principally  the  responsibility  of  the  developed  nations,  though 
developing nations  are playing an  increasing role. 
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3.  Problems  of  the  Global  Environment 
"The  biosphere  recognizes  no  division  into  blocs, 
alliances  or systems.  All  share  the  same  climatic  system 
and no  one is  in a  position to  build his own  isolated and 
independent line of environmental  defense." 
Eduard  Shevardnadze,  1988 
Even  though  developed nations  comprise  only  a  small  proportion  (22 
percent)  of  humankind  and  feature  low  rates  of  population  growth 
(average  of  0.5  percent  per  year),  their  consumption  of  natural 
resources  and  their  environmentally  harmful  technologies  cause  their 
population  factor  to  count  prominently  as  concerns  the 
environment--especially  the  global  environment  which  supports  all 
nations.  To  this  extent,  the  imperative  of  sustainable  development  is 
just as  significant for developed nations  as  for developing nations. 
Global  Warming 
Buildup of  so-called greenhouse  gases  in the  atmosphere  appear  set 
to bring  on  a  phenomenon  of  global  warming  (Houghton et al.,  1990  and 
1992;  see  also Leggett,  1990;  Oppenheimer  and  Boyle,  1990;  Schneider, 
1989).  What  is the  role  of population growth? 
Western  Europe  and  North America,  while  comprising only  13  percent 
of global population,  are  responsible  for  roughly  65  percent  of  the 
fossil-fuel carbon dioxide  emissions  that account  for half of  global-
warming  processes.  The  European  Community,  with  only  6.3  percent  of 
global population,  accounts  for  13  percent  (Table  5);  on  a  per-capita 
basis,  the  Community's  share  is  2.3  tonnes  per  year,  a  level  surpassed 
only by North America with 5  tonnes,  as  against a  global average  of less 
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than  1  tonne.  Developing  nations,  with  77  percent  of  the  world's 
population,  contribute  only  a  small  (albeit  fast  growing)  share  of 
fossil-fuel emissions  of carbon dioxide.  But  they contribute  30  percent 
of  total  carbon  dioxide  emissions  taking  into  account  tropical 
deforestation as  well  as  fossil  fuels. 
According to  a  pioneering analysis  by  Harrison  (1992;  see  also 
Holdren,  1990),  population  growth  in developing nations  has  accounted 
for  46  percent  of  increased  carbon  dioxide  emissions  during  the  period 
1960-88  (and  in developed nations,  35  percent).  In the  future,  the  role 
of  population  growth  in  conjunction with  economic  advancement  in 
developing  nations  will  become  more  pronounced,  generating  by  2025  a 
projected additional 5.8 billion tonnes  of carbon dioxide--a total to be 
compared with  the  present worldwide  annual  total of 8.0 billion tonnes. 
(If India were  to use  the  same  meagre  amount  of energy  in 2010  as  today, 
its carbon dioxide  emissions  would  jump  by  70  percent  simply  due  to 
population growth  (Sadik,  1992).)  Whereas  developed nations now  account 
for  roughly  70  percent  of total  carbon  dioxide  emissions  and  developing 
nations  30  percent,  these  proportions  under  a  "business  as  usual" 
scenario are  likely to be  reversed by  2025  or shortly thereafter. 
Several other greenhouse  gases apart  from  carbon dioxide account for 
the other half of global warming processes.  For details of the  European 
Commuunity's  emissions,  see  Table  5. 
So  far as  we  can discern--there is much  uncertainty--global warming 
would  exert profoundly  harmful  impacts  on  the  world's,  and  especially 
developing  nations',  capacity  to  grow  food.  Preliminary  analysis 
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suggests  it could  well  reduce  present  croplands  by  as  much  one  third 
(within  a  range  of  10-50  percent)  (Schneider,  1989);  and  droughts  could 
cause  a  10-percent  drop  in  grain harvests  on  average  three  times  a 
decade  (Daily  and  Ehrlich,  1990).  The  latest  and  much  the  most 
extensive  assessment  proposes  a  10-15 percent decline  in grain harvests, 
with  substantial shortfalls  for  many  other crops,  in  large  parts  of  the 
tropics,  plus  perhaps  reduced  yields  in  North  America;  and  the 
consequences  could  include  a  rapid  rise of  400  million in the  number  of 
people  at risk  from hunger,  soaring to  a  total of more  than  1  billion 
within 50  years  (Rosenzweig  and Parry,  1992).  Alternatively calculated, 
there  could  ensue  the malnutrition deaths  of  as  many  as  800  million 
people  over  20  years  (Daily  and  Ehrlich,  1990).  Note,  moreover,  that 
all  these  analyses  conclude  the  best  mode  of  adaptation  to  the 
greenhouse  threat is to  reduce  population growth. 
For further  analysis  of global  warming,  including consideration of 
the  potent  greenhouse  gas  methane,  together  with  additional  details  of 
global warming's  potential impact  on  food  production,  see Appendix  6. 
Ozone-Layer Depletion 
Ozone-layer depletion will have  many  human-health  repercussions 
such  as  increased  cancers  and  eye  cataracts,  together with  a  host  of 
adverse  effects  for  crop  plants  on  land  and  phytoplankton-based  food 
chains  in the  seas  (Benedick,  1990;  Mintzer et al.,  1990). 
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height,  global  output  totalled  1,180,000  tonnes.  Of  this,  the  seven 
leading  European  Community  producer  nations  amounted  to  634,000  tonnes, 
or  almost  54  percent  (Table  6).  As  for  consumption,  the  European 
Community  accounted  for  around  320,000  tonnes  or  27  percent  of  the 
global total,  out  of  88  percent  for  the  developed nations  as  a  whole. 
Developing  nations  produced  slightly  over  200,000  tonnes  or  17  percent 
of the  global total,  and  they  consumed  less  than  120,000  tonnes  or  10 
percent.  Thus  the  Community  produced  CFCs  at  a  rate  37  times  the 
developing nations'  per-capita average,  and  consumed  them  at  a  rate  30 
times  the  developing nations'  per-capita average. 
But if recent  trends  of population growth  and  CFC  production were 
to continue,  the  developing nations'  output  of  CFCs  would  reach  roughly 
30  percent of  the  global total as  early  as  the  year  2000  (Phillips, 
1990;  Rosencrantz  and  Milligan,  1990;  and  for  some  clarificatory 
details,  see Appendix 3.).  Fortunately the  international community  has 
taken  steps  to  phase  out  CFC  production  by  the  year  2000  (the  European 
Community  and  the  United  States  have  decided  to  end it by  1995).  This 
initiative has  won  support  from  most  leading  CFC  producers,  both actual 
and potential.  But  there is emergent  evidence  that even these  cuts will 
not  be  enough  to  safeguard the  ozone  layer.  Over  northern Europe  the 
layer is  disappearing  twice  as  fast  as  previously  assumed--and  the  rate 
could well  double  again  by  the  end  of  the  1990s,  and  even  double  yet 
again during  the first half of next  century.  All  the  more  reason  for 
CFC  production to be halted forthwith. 
33 ( 
Chapter III 
POPULATION  AND  ENVIRONMENT  LINKAGES:  ILLUSTRATIVE  SECTORS 
"The  "triad" of excessive population growth,  environmental 
degradation  and poverty  threaten  us  and  our planet  as  never 
before." 
International  Forum  on  Population in the 
21st Century,  Amsterdam,  November  6-9,  1989 
In  this  chapter  we  shall  look  at  a  short  selection  of 
population/environment  linkages  to illustrate the  conceptual analysis of 
Chapter II. 
Illustrative Sectors* 
a)  Soil Erosion 
Agricultural  lands  are  losing topsoil at  a  rate  of  24  billion 
tonnes  per year  (Brown  et al.,  1990;  see also Pimentel,  1992).  The  cost 
to  soil  fertility  and  agricultural  production  is  high:  unchecked 
erosion  could  well  cause  a  decline  of  almost  30  percent  in  food  output 
from  rainfed croplands  during the period 1985-2010  (Sfeir-Younis,  1986). 
A good part,  though  only  a  part,  of this  problem is  due  to population 
growth,  especially  among  impoverished  peasantry--precisely  those  people 
inclined  to  feature  the  highest  fertility  rates.  Population  pressures 
result  in  subdivision  of  smallholdings  into  ever-smaller  plots, 
sometimes  as  little as  one  hectare or less,  whereupon  croplands  are 
subject  to  over-intensive  cultivation  and  accelerating  soil  erosion. 
Of  course  a  number  of other factors  are  at  work,  such  as  faulty 
*There  is not  space  here  to  set  out  all  the  documentary  evidence  and 
detailed  analyses.  For further assessment,  see Appendix 8. 
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agricultural  practices,  lack  of  extension  services,  and  inadequate 
policy  emnphasis  on  subsistence agriculture.  But  population  growth 
often plays  a  prominent  part,  and  a  pre-eminent  part  in  many  high-
density areas. 
b)  Desertification 
Desertification causes  at  least  60,000  square  kilometres  of 
agricultural land to be  eliminated each year  (an area almost  the  size of 
Ireland),  and  another  200,000  square  kilometres  (equivalent  to  the 
United  Kingdom)  to be  so  impoverished  that  crop  yields  fall off  sharply 
(Dregne  and  Tucker,  1988).  It undermines  the  livelihoods of 850  million 
people,  with costs  in the  form of agricultural output  foregone  totalling 
$30  billion per year  (Mabbutt,  1984).  Population growth is generally 
higher  (3  percent  or  more  per  year)  in  semi-arid  and  arid  lands  than 
elsewhere.  As  in the  case  of  soil erosion,  population pressure  is  far 
from  the  only  factor.  But  it is  frequently  a  reinforcing if not  a 
triggering variable. 
c)  Water Deficits 
Water  consumption has  doubled  twice  this  century,  and  demand  is 
projected to double  again during the next  two  decades,  primarily because 
of population  growth.  At  least  2  billion people  already  suffer chronic 
water  shortages  (Falkenmark,  1990  and  1991;  la Riviere,  1989).  Within 
another  decade  at most,  virtually all nations  of  North Africa  (a  region 
of  special  interest  to  the  European  Community  if only  because  of  the 
migration  factor),  also  of  East  Africa,  are  expected  to  experience 
critical water  deficits.  Much  the  same  applies  to  Syria,  Jordan, 
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Lebanon  and  Israel,  nations  that  share  the  waters  of  the  River  Jordan 
system  and  face  potential  conflict  in view  of  acute  water  shortages  in 
the  river basin  (Starr  and  Stoll,  1988).  In  the  developing  world  as  a 
whole,  the  number  of  water-short  people  totals  more  than  300  million 
today,  and  is  projected to  reach  3  billion  by  2025.  Of  the  latter 
total,  well  over  1  billion people  are  expected  to  be  in Africa,  or two-
thirds  of  the  continent's  entire  population  (Falkenmark  and  Suprato, 
1992;  Sadik,  1992). 
d)  Tropical Deforestation 
Tropical  forests  have  already  lost  roughly half their expanse,  and 
are currently declining by  about  2  percent per year.  The  rate  almost 
doubled  during  the  1980s,  and  there  is  good  reason  to  suppose  it could 
double  again  during  the  1990s  if only  because  of  the  phenomenon  of  the 
displaced  peasant  who  now  accounts  for  at  least  60  percent  of  all 
deforestation--a  proportion  that  is  increasing  (Myers,  199lb).  This 
"shifted"  cultivator is  expanding  in numbers  far  faster  than national 
population  growth  rates,  meaning  there  are  other  factors  besides  simple 
population  increase  that  are  pushing  him  into  the  forests.  But 
population growth can be  roughly  reckoned  to cause  almost  four-fifths  of 
present deforestation  (Harrison,  1992;  Myers,  1990a). 
e)  Mass  Extinction of Species 
The  great majority  of Earth's  species,  estimated at  30  million, 
occur  in tropical forests.  Due  to deforestation  (and  in the  absence  of 
incisive  and  urgent  counter-measures),  we  should  anticipate  the 
elimination of  as  many  as  half of all species  within the  coming  decades 
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(Myers,  1990b;  Wilson,  1992).  The  population  factor  contributing  to 
deforestation  (almost  four-fifths)  translates  into  a  present  extinction 
rate of 120,000  species per year  (a  rate that is  increasing rapidly),  or 
at least 100,000  times  the natural  "background"  rate. 
f)  Ultra-Rapid Urban  Growth 
The  main  distribution impact  of  population  growth  expresses  itself 
in  an  urban  growth  rate  that  expanded  developing-nation  urban 
communities  from  286  million people  in 1950  to 1.3 billion in 1987,  and 
is projected to further  expand it to almost  4  billion by  2025  (Brown  and 
Jacobson,  1987).  This  growth  rate  far  exceeds  the  planning  capacity of 
governments  to  accomodate  it.  The  result  is  an  outburst  of  shantytown 
and other slum-type  settlements  (Lowe,  1991).  At  least 1.2 billion 
people  or  60  percent  of  developing-nation city dwellers  now  live  on  the 
margins  of survival in conditions  of extreme  poverty and  squalor  (Hardoy 
and  Satterthwaite,  1989). 
g)  Wastes 
We  might  suppose  that wastes  are  due  to careless  consumerism  and 
negligent  technology,  with  population  growth  playing  a  trifling  role 
(Commoner,  1990).  Developing  nations,  with  three-quarters  of  the 
world's  population,  account  for  only  one  quarter  of  present  global 
production of waste.  But  through population growth  alone,  they  are 
projected to  contribute  60  percent  of all new  waste  generated between 
1985  and  2025;  and if we  add  in  the  factor  of  income  growth  as  well,  we 
find their share  rises  to  83  percent--even though per-capita waste  would 
still be  little more  than  one  fifth  of  that  of  a  developed-nation 
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citizen  (Shaw,  1989). 
Review of Population Impacts  on  Environment 
In brief review,  note  that,  according  to an  illuminating analysis 
by  Harrison  (1992),  population  growth  in  developing  nations  has 
accounted for: 
--72 percent of expansion of arable  lands  during 1961-85,  leading 
to  desertification,  deforestation  and  decline  of  many 
natural environments; 
--79 percent of deforestation during 1973-88,  leading to an average 
of at least 70,000  species  extinctions  each year; 
--69  percent  of  increase  in  livestock  numbers  during  1961-85, 
leading  to  soil erosion,  desertification,  deforestation  and 
methane  (greenhouse  gas)  emissions;  and 
--46 percent of growth  in carbon dioxide  emissions  from  fossil 
fuels  during 1960-88. 
The  sector  summaries  reveal  environment/population  interactions 
(_  in  illustration of  the  theme  of  critical  linkages  presented  in Chapter 
II.  Let us  now  consider how  the European Community  relates  to particular 
environment  problems  in developing nations. 
Particular Linkages  to the European Community 
By  virtue of proliferant  linkages  both environmental  and  economic, 
the  European  Community  interacts  with  developing  nations  in  a  manner 
that  impinges  upon  population  and  environment  factors,  and  vice  versa. 
Herewith three  examples  of  such linkages: 
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a)  Tropical Deforestation 
One  fifth of tropical deforestation is attributable  to over-heavy 
logging  that  not  only  removes  a  good  part  of  the  tree  stock  but  leaves 
much  of  the  residual  forest  injured beyond  recovery  (Myers,  1992b). 
This  eliminates  the  scope  for  a  second  harvest within  many  decades;  the 
amount  of logged areas  that are managed  for  sustained yield is less  than 
half  of  one  percent.  Around  30  percent  of  the  hardwood  timber  harvest 
goes  to  overseas  markets  in  developed  nations;  and  the  European 
Community  accounts  for  30  percent  of  these  exports  by  value.  The 
imported timber bears  a  price that is far  from  reflecting the full costs 
of  production  (it does  not  include  long-term  and  deep-seated  damage  to 
the  left-over forest).  So  it is artificially cheap,  and  stimulates 
excessive  consumption  on  the part of  developed nations.  To  this  extent, 
the  European  Community  plays  a  part--an unwitting  but  an  effective 
part--in tropical deforestation. 
b)  The  Cassava Connection 
In parts of Southeast Asia,  tropical deforestation has  been  due  to 
the  expansion of croplands  for  cassava.  Otherwise  known  as  manioc, 
cassava is  rich in calories,  hence  it has  come  into  increasing use  as  a 
foodstuff  for  livestock in the  European  Community  (Dijksterhuis  and 
Sprang,  1988;  Smit,  1988).  The  three  main  nations  concerned,  (the 
former)  West  Germany,  Belgium  and  Netherlands,  have  been  absorbing  a 
sizeable  share  of  internationally traded cassava.  Most  of  the  traded 
crop is  grown  in Thailand,  from  where  the  European  Community  imported 
1.5 million tonnes  of cassava  in 1973,  an  amount  that  rapidly  rose  by 
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1982  to  more  than  8  million  tonnes.  The  principal  cassava  growers  have 
included  a  fast-increasing  number  of  smallscale  farmers,  especially  in 
the  eastern  and  northeastern  parts  of  the  nation  where  they  have 
established their crops  at the  expense  of  forest.  The  price  for  cassava 
does  not  reflect  the  concealed cost  of  deforestation.  Fortunately  the 
trade has  recently declined a  good  deal. 
c)  Genetic Depletion 
The  mass  extinction of species  underway  results  in the depletion of 
genetic  resources  that  could  make  many  contributions  to  Europeans' 
welfare.  In agriculture,  all our major  crops  require  regular  infusions 
of  fresh  germplasm  to  expand  their productivity and  to maintain their 
resistance  to disease  and  their environmental  adaptability  (this  last 
attribute will become  all the  more  important  in a  greenhouse-affected 
world).  The  commercial  value  of  this  genetic  improvement  was  worth  $1 
billion a  year  to  American  farmers  ten  years  ago.  We  can  also  look  to 
wild plant  species  for entirely new  foods  such  as  the  tropical fruits 
and vegetables  that increasingly appear in European  supermarkets.  In the 
medicinal  sector,  one  pharmacy  prescription  in  four  is  based  on 
startpoint materials  from  wild  species.  The  commercial  value  worldwide 
is at least  $40  billion a  year,  of which  genetic  resources  contribute 
roughly  2  to  4  percent. 
Thus  the European Community  derives many  economic  benefits  from  the 
genetic materials  of wild species.  Yet  we  enjoy  these  benefits after 
scientists have  undertaken  intensive  screening of  only  one  in 100  plant 
species,  and  fewer  than  one  in 5000  animal  species,  to  assess  their 
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potential  economic  contributions.  This  indicates  the  European 
Community's  stake  in  the  survival  of  species,  the  great  bulk  of  them 
located in developing nations--and already being eliminated at a  rate of 
several hundred per day. 
These  three  instances  of  EC/developing nation  linkages  are  a  small 
sample  of  abundant  interactions,  both  economic  and  environmental. 
Similar linkages  arise with respect  to desertification,  landlessness  and 
global  warming,  together  with  the  strongly  associated  factors  of 
population,  poverty and migration. 
The  "Big Picture"  Interests of  the  European Community 
As  we  have  seen in Chapter I,  population growth  and  environmental 
decline  in  developing  nations,  leading  to  declining  prospects  for 
sustainable  development,  have  all  manner  of  negative  repercussions  for 
the  European  Community.  By  reason of its  own  economic  outlook  and  of 
social  stability and  political harmony  worldwide,  as  well  as  the 
emergent  phenomenon  of mass  migration,  the  Community  will fare  less well 
in  a  world  characterized  by  a  growing  divide  between  the  "haves"  and 
"have nots". 
True,  we  cannot  always  postulate  immediate  and  obvious  connections 
between developing-nation questions  of population and  environment  on  the 
one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  pre-eminent  interests  of  the 
European  Community.  The  linkages  vary  widely.  In  the  case  of  the 
rising tide of  immigrants  from  North Africa and other developing nations 
of  the  Mediterranean  basin,  the  impact  on  the  Community's  interests  is 
direct.  In cases  where  environment  and population problems  contribute to 
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political  instability  and  even  outright  conflict  in  areas  of  strategic 
value  to  Europe,  e.g.  the nations  of  the  Jordan Valley,  the  impact  is 
more  indirect. 
In  some  instances,  such as  sub-Saharan Africa where  environmental 
decline  and  population  increase  are  more  widespread  than  in other parts 
of  the  developing world,  the  impacts  are  diffused  in both  space  and 
time.  But  if  the  region  degenerates  into  endemic  poverty,  social 
upheaval  and  political  disintegration,  this  will  mean  the  loss  of 
trading partners  and  the  waste  of decades-long  investment  and  financial 
aid on  the  part of the  Community.  It will  raise humanitarian  questions 
in  the  face  of  human  suffering  on  an  unprecedented  scale.  It  will 
supply  abundant  scope  for  Gaddafi-style  adventurism  with  prospect  of 
proliferating conflicts and violence.  Human  degradation with scant hope 
of  relief is  the  breeding  ground  for  excesses  of  both  the  far  left and 
the  far right. 
Regrettably,  environment  and population problems  seldom  generate 
the  sense  of urgency  that accompanies  economic  crises  and political 
instability,  no  matter  how  closely  they  might  be  related  in  the  long 
term.  If the  urgent  drives  out  the  important  today,  the  important  can 
become  the  imperative  tomorrow--when  there  may  be  much  less  room  to 
manoeuver  in response. 
Of  course it is easy  to over-state  the  case  for  greater European 
Community  involvement  in environment  and  population issues  way  beyond 
its horizon.  It would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  these  problems  are 
42 often the  main,  let alone  the  sole,  factor  at  issue  in  the  failure  to 
achieve  sustainable  development.  It would  equally  be  a  mistake  to 
suppose  that  these  problems  do  not  often play  a  substantive  role.  No 
more,  and certainly no  less. 
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Chapter  IV 
POLICY  RESPONSES  ON  THE  PART  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
"Without effective environmental  protection,  development 
cooperation can only lead to a  dead  end  that  could prove 
disastrous  for mankind." 
Helmut  Kohl,  1988 
"Those  who  make  $200  a  year should not pay so  that those 
who  make  $10,000  a  year can breathe  clean air.  We  are all 
in the  same  planetary boat.  A few  of us  travel  first  class, 
while  most  are in steerage.  But if the  boat  sinks,  we  all 
drown  together." 
Ambassador Edward  Kufuor,  Chairman of Group of 77,  1991 
This  paper demonstrates  there are multiple problems  of population 
growth  and  environmental  decline.  In many  instances  these  profound 
problems  can still be  turned into exceptional opportunities for counter-
measures,  both  remedial  and  preventive.  There  is much  scope  for  timely 
and  incisive  initiatives  on  the  part  of policy makers,  with  a  highly 
positive  payoff  extending  into  the  indefinite future.  But  time  is at a 
premium. 
1.  Perception of the  Problems  in Their Proper  Scope 
What  can the European Community  do  to promote  the  environment  and 
population  fields?  First off,  its policy makers  can  ensure  they 
understand the  two  thematic  areas  in their proper  scope.  Environment 
and  population  issues  are  exceptionally  interwoven,  especially  as 
concerns  their causality  and  impacts.  So  policy  makers  must  take 
account not  only of  the  speed  and  scale  of accumulating  problems,  but 
also of their multiple  inter-relationships.  Energy  strategies affect 
crop production,  and vice versa.  Tropical deforestation  influences 
climate  change,  and  in  turn,  global  warming  is  likely  to  affect 
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distribution of  the  world's  forests.  And  so  on.  Most  of  these  diverse 
interactions will  grow  more  numerous  and  significant,  and will have 
greater influence--both quantitative and qualitative--on more  sectors  of 
development  and  on more  human  communities. 
Just  as  problems  tend  to  be  interlinked,  so  do  solutions.  Tree 
planting  in  developing  nations  not  only  supplies  commercial  timber  and 
fuelwood.  It conserves  topsoil,  reduces  flooding  and  drought,  supports 
irrigated agriculture  and  hydropower  energy,  supplies  domestic  water  of 
sufficient  quantity  and  quality,  and  slows  the  buildup  of  carbon 
dioxide.  So  too  with  energy:  as  we  increase  the  efficiency  of 
production and  consumption,  we  achieve  three  other goals:  we  foster 
greater economic  growth for  each unit of energy  expended,  we  reduce  acid 
rain,  and we  slow carbon dioxide  buildup.  Probably  the greatest example 
of these  impact-reinforcing linkages  lies with population planning.  One 
of  the  best  ways  to  reduce  population  growth  is  to  reduce  infant 
mortality,  thus  enhancing motivation for  family  planning;  and  one  of the 
best  ways  to  reduce  infant mortality  is  to  supply  more  potable 
water--which brings  us  back to tree planting. 
For  sure,  it is difficult to modify  existing policy patterns.  But 
policy decisions  taken  today  should be  viewed  in  terms  of  a  crucial 
choice  between  a  difficult  while  still tolerable  transition  to  a 
radically  altered world,  and  a  far  more  difficult  transition  to  a 
profoundly perturbed world with many  adverse  consequences  for  human 
welfare  and  international stability. 
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The  global  community  of nations  has  now  reached  a  stage  where  no 
individual  nation  can  shield itself  from  many  forms  of  environmental 
degradation and population pressure  in other nations.  Not  even the most 
advanced  and  powerful  nation  or  group  of  nations  can  insulate  itself 
from  environment/population problems  and  the  economic  hardships  and 
political dislocations  they  generate  in distant parts  of  the  Earth. 
Interdependence  is here  to  stay,  an  established  fact  of  everyday 
life--however  little certain political  leaders  are  inclined  to  embrace 
it wholeheartedly  (Hurrell  and  Kingsbury,  1992;  Ramphal,  1992;  Thomas, 
1992;  Wright,  1991). 
Given  the  challenge of  interdependence,  with its problems  and its 
opportunities,  there is a  growing  premium  on collective action to tackle 
collective  problems.  Global  warming  clearly  demonstrates  that  we  now 
face  environmental  problems  to which all nations  contribute  and  by  which 
all will be  affected.  This  highlights  the  imperative  of cooperative 
endeavour--which  in  the  case  of  developing  nations  means  expanded 
support  from  developed nations.  Similar considerations  apply  to  other 
problems  such  as  ozone-layer  depletion  and  mass  extinction  of  species. 
So  while  there  is  now  less  leeway  for  the  European  Community  to  "go  it 
alone",  there  is  increased  scope  for  the  Community  to make  common  cause 
with  other  nations,  especially  developing  nations.  In  turn,  this 
postulates  a  policy  framework  that  reflects  the  new  constraints--the 
creative constraints--of interdependence. 
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Against  these  two  background  perspectives  as  concerns  policy 
options  for  the  European  Community,  let  us  now  examine  some  sector-by-
sector initiatives available. 
3.  Aid 
The  European Community--meaning both the  individual nations  and  the 
Commission--supplied  developing  nations  with  a  1990  total  of  $31 
billion of aid  (also  known  as  Official  Development  Assistance,  or ODA). 
This  sum  amounted  to  57  percent of all ODA.  But it equated  to  only  0.5 
percent  of  Community  GNP,  falling  below  the  United  Nations' 
recommendation of 0.7 percent--though better than the  developed naitons' 
average,  0.3  percent  (Table  7). 
More  pertinent still,  the  sum  of  $31  billion worked  out  to  only 
about  one  fifth of the  amount  by  which  the  Community  grew  richer in 
1990.  (An  annual  2-percent  increase  in Community  affluence  works  out  to 
an extra  $200  per citizen,  or as  much  as  the entire annual  income  of the 
400  milion poorest  people.)  If the  Community's  aid had  been  doubled  to 
1.0  percent  of  GNP  (Netherlands  and  Denmark  both  supplied  ODA 
approaching this  level),  it would  have  achieved much  for  developing 
nations:  it would  have  been equivalent  to  roughly  30  percent of  the 
collective  GNP  of  the  region  to  which  the  Community  gives  special 
attention,  sub-Saharan Africa. 
But  only  a  little over 1  percent of  ODA  goes  to  population-related 
programmes  and  a  similarly small  amount  to  specifically environment 
programmes.  There  is  great  scope  to  expand  support  for  the  two 
programme  areas  that in many  respects  are  the  foundation  for  sustainable 
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in  supplying  aid  of  conventional  sort  for  agriculture  if it does  not 
take explicit account  of measures  to protect  soil,  water,  atmosphere, 
climate  and  whatever  other  environmental  resources  are  critical  to 
sustainable agriculture.  Nor  is  there  long-term purpose  in growing 
extra food  for extra mouths  if it is apparent  that the extra mouths  will 
become  so  numerous  that  they will  eventually  overwhelm  the  best efforts 
to  expand  food  production--and  likewise  deplete  the  capacity  of 
agricultural lands  to maintain  food  production. 
Policy makers  could also investigate the potential for  "foreign-aid 
leverage"  with  respect  to  those  developing  nations  that  devote 
inordinate  sums  to military activities.  In 1988,  developing nations  as 
a  whole  spent  two  and  a  half  times  as  much  on  their military  as  they 
received in ODA  (Sivard,  1991).  Were  ODA  to be  restricted to e.g.  those 
nations  that devote  no  more  than  2  percent  of their GNP  to military 
activities  (current  average,  almost  5  percent),  this  would  release 
enormous  sums  for  productive  application in all manner  of  fields  that 
pr~m?te sustainable  development,  including environment  and population. 
More  important again,  there  is  paramount  need  to  incorporate 
environment  and population factors  into all development  policies  in  a 
systematized  and  comprehensive  manner--a  measure  to  be  heeded  by  policy 
makers  in both developed  and  developing nations.  The  challenge  is  to 
modify  policy  makers'  outlook  so  profoundly  that  they  no  longer  look 
upon  environment/population  and  development  as  discrete  arenas  of 
activity.  Rather  they  should perceive  them  as  two  sides  of the  one 
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separate  entities,  policy  makers  will  continue  to  consider  environment 
as  a  constraint on  development,  to be  articulated as  little more  than an 
"add  on"  factor rather than a  "built in"  dimension.  Similarly they will 
view population-planning measures  as  an occasional option rather than an 
over-riding imperative. 
With  specific  respect  to  environment,  a  sound  initiative could lie 
with  the  introduction  of  "natural  resource  accounting"  (Appendix  9). 
During  the period 1971-84 Indonesia's  GNP  was  conventionally  reckoned  to 
be  growing  at  an  average  rate  of  7.1  percent  per  year.  But  if account 
had  been  taken  of  resource  depletion,  the  rate  would  have  been  reduced 
to only  4  percent per year,  meaning  that almost half the  growth had been 
unsustainable  (Repetto,  1986a). 
4.  Trade 
The  Community  engages  in much  trade with developing nations.  It 
exports  more  (30  percent of its export total)  to developing nations  than 
to  the  United  States  and  Japan  together;  and  the  Community  is  the 
leading  market  for  developing  nations,  taking  21  percent  of  their 
exports.  This  offers  sizeable  scope  for  the  Community  to  influence  its 
trading partners  to pursue  more  substantive  environment  policies.  An 
obvious  example  is  tropical  timber,  which  currently  is  almost  entirely 
harvested through non-sustainable methods--to  the  long-term detriment of 
the  Community  which will  see  its timb'er  imports  declining  as  stocks 
diminish  (tropical-forest nations  themselves  are  expected  for  the  most 
part to  become  net  importers  of  timber by  early next  century).  The 
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ensure  reforestation in source nations  of the  tropics. 
More  importantly,  the  Community  should  re-examine its policies on 
trade  restrictions  as  concerns  imports  from  developing nations.  At 
present,  many  such imports  face  developed-nation barriers in the  form  of 
taxes,  quotas  and  the  like.  This  costs  developing  nations  a  full  $100 
billion of  trade  earnings  foregone  annually,  or  almost  twice  as  much 
they  receive  through all foreign  aid  (George,  1992;  World  Bank,  1992). 
Were  more  foreign-exchange  revenues  available  via  expanding  exports  to 
the  Community  (notably  food  exports,  the  CAP  notwithstanding),  this 
would  generate  additional  economic  resources  for  environmental  and 
population-planning  purposes  among  other  objectives  of  developing 
nations  (and  recall  the  demonstrable  connection  between  economic 
advancement  and fertility reduction). 
Probably  most  important  of all  is  the  GATT  connection.  A 
successful  GATT  accord would  increase  the  growth  rate  of developing 
nations  by  roughly  3  percent,  with all  that  means  for  the  funding  of 
sustainable  development  (International  Monetary  Fund,  1989).  True, 
liberalization of  trade  could  lead  to  the  erosion of  environmental 
values  if it  simultaneously  promoted  free-for-all  exploitation  of 
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environment-based  resources  (Arden-Clarke,  1991).  But  special 
provisions  on this  front- are  feasible  enough,  especially if sponsored by 
the  European  Community:  to  some  (limited)  extent,  the  Community  already 
seeks  to integrate environmental values  into its trade policies. 
50 Specially significant under  the  trade heading are  the  Community's 
food  exports  within  the  context  of  the  CAP.  The  CAP  supplies  subsidies 
to  Community  farmers  now  amounting  to  $40  billion per year  in  order  to 
grow  food  way  beyond  the  Community's  needs  (ironically,  the  Community 
now  has  several  times  more  surplus  food  than  would  meet  Africa's 
deficits).  When  artificially  cheap  food  is  released  by  developed 
nations  onto  world  markets,  this  depresses  food  prices  in  developing 
nations,  effectively  depriving  developing-nation  farmers  of  food-export 
income  estimated at  $30  billion per  year  (World  Bank,  1991)--a  sum 
equivalent to  almost half of all ODA. 
5.  Debt 
International  debt  is  a  major  burden  on  developing  nation 
economies.  Among  other  restrictions,  it limits  their efforts  to 
safeguard  their  environmental  resource  base  and  to  pursue  population 
planning.  Developing nations  owe  in the  order of  $100  billion to  the 
European  Community.  As  a  measure  of  the  debt  burden,  note  that  when  we 
consider all flows  of  ODA  plus  new  loans  from  developed  nations  to 
developing nations,  and  subtract this  from  debt  repayments,  we  find that 
from  1983  to  1989  there  was  a  net  annual  financial  flow  of  $40-50 
billion  from  the  South  to  the  North.  Fortunately  the  balance  has  been 
positive  since  1990,  but  by  an  amount  of  only  about  $10  billion per 
year,  a  sum  that effectively cancels  out  one  fifth of total ODA. 
Steps  toward debt-reduction have  been taken by  individual Community 
nations,  notably  Germany,  France  and  the United  Kingdom,  to  forgive 
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developed  nations  of  sub-Saharan  Africa.  This  approach  could  well  be 
expanded,  and with respect  to private  as  well  as  public  debt.  In  the 
commercial  sector,  moreover,  there  is  scope  to  change  the  laws  on  tax 
systems  in order to encourage private banks  to  reduce  debt without  undue 
injury to their financial  interests. 
There  is also opportunity  for  the  Community  to  engage  in debt-for-
nature  swaps  and  similar  forms  of  "creative  financing"  as  concerns  the 
environment  generally  (the  same  applies  to  population)  (Durning,  1989; 
French,  1992;  Mikesell  and Williams,  1992;  World'Bank,  1992).  Additional 
policy  leverage  can  be  generated  through  debt-relief  measures  (and  the 
same  through aid and  trade  initiatives).  The  European  Community  should 
seek  to  influence  those  developing  nations  that  engage  in 
environmentally  harmful  practices,  unwittingly  harmful  as  these 
practices  often are.  For  instance,  covert  subsidies  serve  to  foster 
over-exploitation  of  tropical  forests,  over-loading  of  croplands, 
excessive  application  of  pesticides,  and  wasteful  use  of  water  and 
energy  (Kosmo,  1986;  Repetto,  1986b;  Repetto  and  Gillis,  1988). 
Elimination of  these  subsidies  would  not  only  safeguard  environmental 
resources,  it would promote  economic  efficiency as well. 
6.  Global Warming 
The  bulk  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  especially  carbon  dioxide 
emissions,  stems  from  developed nations.  These  nations  have  recently 
achieved much  in energy  savings:  in 1988  they used  one  quarter less 
energy  (mainly  from  fossil  fuels,  the  chief  source  of  carbon  dioxide 
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curtail carbon dioxide  emissions  are  underway  through e.g.  the  carbon 
tax proposed for  the  European Community.  This  policy approach  should be 
pursued with greater vigour.  Without  greatly  increased efforts  to  stem 
global  warming,  there  will  be  scant  sustainable  development  for  the 
entire world.  While  it is  commendable  that certain Community  nations 
aim  for  a  marginal  decrease  in carbon  dioxide  emissions  by  2000  and 
still larger cutbacks  early next century,  they  should bear  in mind  that 
if we  are  to  stabilize climate  we  must  aim at  a  60-percent  reduction  in 
these emissions. 
Fortunately there is  immense  scope  to meet  energy needs  through the 
strategy that is most widely available  and least exploited to date,  viz. 
energy  efficiency  and  conservation.  Not  only  is  this  the  cheapest 
response,  it would  serve to make  Community  economies  more  productive  and 
competitive.  For developed nations  as  a  whole,  they could--with present 
technologies  and  the  right policy incentives--cut per-capita energy 
consumption  by  half while  allowing  for  a  50-100  percent  advance  in 
living standards.  As  for  developing nations,  if they  were  to  fully 
utilize all  energy-efficiency  and  -conservation  technologies  now 
available,  they could achieve  immense  economic  progress with only an 11-
percent  increase  in energy  consumption;  and  they  would  save  $30  billion 
per year  that would  otherwise  be  needed  to  pay  for  imported oil and new 
power plants  (Goldemberg et al.,  1987). 
A number  of other policy options  are  available.  These  include  the 
idea of  "carbon emission  trading permits",  setting up  a  de  facto  market 
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to  absorb  carbon  from  the  atmosphere  (Myers  and  Goreau,  1991)  (for  some 
details  of  a  tree planting initiative on  the  part of  the  Netherlands, 
see Appendix 10). 
Global  warming  can  also  be  reduced  by  population planning.  If 
present  trends  are  projected  from  1985  to  2100,  population  growth  will 
account  for  more  than  one  third of all the  increase  in carbon  dioxide 
emissions  and  for  close  to half  of  the  increase  in developing nations 
(Bongaarts,  1992). 
7.  Ozone-Layer Depletion 
The  Community  plans  to  phase  out all CFCs  and  associated  ozone-
destroying  chemicals  by  1995.  But  the  Community  should  consider 
bringing  an  end  to  all  such  chemicals  still sooner  in light  of  the 
growing  evidence  of  ozone  depletion  in  many  parts  of  the  world, 
including Europe. 
8.  Population 
Thus  far we  have  looked mainly at environment  issues,  albeit with 
some  regard  to  their population  dimension.  Now  for  population  itself. 
This  paper has  demonstrated  that  population  growth  exerts  a  pervasively 
adverse  impact  on  developing nations'  hopes  for  economic  advancement, 
especially  as  concerns  the  environmental  resource  base  that  ultimately 
supports  all  economic  activity  and  hence  is  a  crucial  factor  in 
sustainable development.  This  determinant  factor notwithstanding,  there 
has  been all  too  little attention  given  to  population  issues.  This 
applies notably to initiatives to  reduce  population growth  through: 
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with respect to the  unmet  needs  of  those hundreds  of millions of couples 
who  possess  motivation  for  family  planning  but  lack  birth-control 
facilities;  and 
2.  Indirect measures  in the  form  of e.g.  (a)  elimination of child 
mortality,  (b)  enhancement  of  women's  status  through  expanded 
opportunities  for  education  and  employment,  and  (c)  reduction  of 
widespread  poverty  (remember  it is  the  most  impoverished  who  tend  to 
have  the  largest families). 
Yet population issues have  been attracting little over  1  percent of 
total  ODA  funds.  This  is quite  unrealistic.  It reflects  a  lack  of 
understanding  of  the  many  population  linkages,  also  population-
environment  linkages,  that  severely  undercut  the  effectivness  of  ODA  in 
the  form  of  support  for  agriculture,  water  resources,  forestry, 
infrastructure both rural  and  urban,  indeed  sustainable  development 
generally.  Despite  huge  investments  on  the part of developed nations  in 
developing nations'  agriculture,  for  instance,  there has  been since the 
mid-1980s  a  marked  decline  in per-capita  food  prooduction.  This  has 
been  partly  due  to  population  increase  (an  additional  600  million 
people),  and partly due  to  environmental degradation  (soil erosion, 
desertification,  salinization of  irrigation systems,  water  shortages, 
deforestation-induced shifts in rainfall patterns,  etc.).  In turn,  these 
deficiencies  reflect  in major  measure  the  pressures  of  too  many  people 
seeking  to  gain  food  from  limited  agricultural  lands.  Of  course  other 
factors  are  at  work:  lack  of  fertile  areas  to  be  brought  into 
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credit facilities,  marketing networks  and  the  like.  It is difficult  to 
determine  the  precise  amount  of  the  problem  that  stems  from  population 
pressures  in themselves.  But  plainly population pressures are  prominent 
factors,  often predominant  factors. 
In  short,  it would  make  sense  to  calculate  (a)  how  much  the 
original  investments  in  agriculture  are  being  undermined  by  population 
growth  and  associated problems  of  environmental  run-down,  and  (b)  how 
much  additional  investment  in  population  issues  would  serve  to 
reinforce  the  investments  in  agriculture.  Despite  its central 
significance,  this  calculation  remains  to  be  undertaken  in  even 
preliminary terms.  It would  be  helpful,  for  instance,  to determine  what 
would  be  the  outcome  if particular projects  were  undertaken  with  and 
without  the  population calculus--bearing in mind  too  the multiplier 
effects,  both  positive  and  negative,  generated  through  numerous 
linkages. 
This  is all the more  pertinent in that population planning has  been 
falling  away  in recent years.  If we  discount China--where  too  there has 
been  some  slowing  in efforts  to  reduce  the  fertility  rate--we  find  that 
population growth  in developing nations  has  remained  around  an  annual 
2.3  percent  for  several  years.  The  UNCED  conference  scarcely  features 
the  issue  on its agenda,  and  the  main documentation  speaks merely  of the 
need  for  "appropriate  demographic  policies".  Plainly  population 
deserves  a  far  more  prominent  place  in  the  Rio  deliberations,  and  this 
supplies  an  admirable  opportunity  for  the  European  Community  to  take  a 
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Policy Framework 
The  Rio  Conference  apart,  what  can  the  Community  do  to  promote 
population planning?  First and  foremost,  its policy  framework  should 
ensure  that all population factors  are  fully  integrated into development 
planning across  the  board.  This  requires  that policies  be  based  on  a 
comprehensive  assessment  of all population factors  and  their impacts, 
both present  and  future.  In particular,  policies  should  reflect  such 
key  questions  as: 
--What  size  of  population,  and  with what  distribution patterns, 
will be  generated  by  a  continuation of presently anticipated rates  of 
growth? 
--What  effects will  this  have  on  the  prospect  for  sustainable 
development,  reflecting in turn the  environmental-resource  base? 
--How  far can sustainable  development  be  fostered  by  reduced  rates 
of population growth--and hence,  how  fast  should rates  of  growth  be 
brought  down? 
--What  scope  is  there,  given  population  structures,  age 
distributions  and  the  like,  for  rapid and  sustained reductions  in growth 
rates?  What  time  horizons  are  relevant,  e.g.  the  years  2000,  2025  and 
2050,  and  the  stage  when  zero  growth  is  finally  achieved?  What  does 
each of these  time  horizons  imply  for population-planning measures  to be 
introduced forthwith? 
Central to  these  considerations it the  question of  demographic 
momentum.  Incisive  and  vigorous  measures  introduced  today  will  exert  a 
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into  the  future.  Similarly,  deferred  action  will  lead  to  ever-
increasing inertia in growth  rates,  making  future  efforts  to  reduce 
growth  all  the  more  difficult--more  complex,  more  taxing,  more  costly, 
and with diminished  success  compared with investment.  Just a  one-decade 
delay  in  achieving  the  family-planning  goals  established  for  the  1990s 
{see  below)  could make  an  eventual  difference  of  4  billion extra people 
in global population  {Sadik,  1992).  In the particular case  of Pakistan, 
with  115  million people  in 1990,  achieving  replacement-level  fertility 
by  2010  instead  of  the  predicted  2035  would  reduce  the  eventual 
population  size  by  222  million,  or  193  percent  of  the  1990  total 
{McNamara,  1991;  and  for  assessment of other nations,  see  Table 8). 
Moreover,  and  as  this paper has  repeatedly demonstrated,  population 
futures  cannot  be  formulated  in an  "environmental  vacuum"  (or  indeed  in 
a  "development  vacuum"  overall).  There  are  many  intimate  relationships 
between  population  growth  and  the  environmental-resource  base  that 
ultimately underpins  all socioeconomic  endeavours  and  hence  the  scope 
for  human  communities  to  sustain  themselves.  This  means  that  all 
population factors  should be  evaluated with respect  to their linkages  to 
environmental  questions--in  a  manner  as  integrative  as  are  the 
interactions  of population and  environment  in the  real world.  Policy 
makers  must  tackle  both  these  fronts  together  if they  are  to  make 
progress  on  either  front.  What  adverse  impacts  will  be  generated 
through continued population growth,  manifested through e.g.  overloading 
of farmlands,  reduction of water  supplies,  decline of forests,  spread of 
deserts,  depletion of the  ozone  layer,  and global warming?  How  far will 
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how  far will efforts  to  reduce  population  growth  serve  to  safeguard  the 
carrying capacity of environmental-resource  stocks? 
Key  question:  How  are  these  population  factors  to  be 
"operationalized",  i.e.  expressed  through  development  planning, 
programmes,  projects  and  other  delivery mechanisms,  and  undertaken  in 
systematized fashion?  One  illustrative approach is to  introduce  a  "trip 
wire"  device  in  order  to  ensure  they  are  steadily  and  firmly 
institutionalized:  all  development  measures  should  be  subject  to 
population  impact  assessment  (akin to environmental  impact  assessments). 
In practical  terms,  development  planners  should  be  formally  required  to 
take  specific  account  of  the  population  dimension  of  all their 
activities.  For  instance,  they  should  methodically  ask  themselves  how 
far will  the  effectiveness  of  their programmes,  projects,  etc.,  be 
reduced  by  population  factors?  How  far  will  their activities  serve  to 
aggravate  environmental  degradation  and  thus  curtail  long-term  carrying 
capacity for  ever-growing populations?  On  the more  positive side,  they 
should ask  themselves  how  far their activities will help to  reduce  child 
mortality  and  poverty,  to  increase  the  overall  status  of  women,  and  to 
tackle  other  questions  that  are  closely  connected  with  population 
concerns. 
To  date,  these critical questions  are  considered  (if considered at 
all)  as  little better than add-on  factors--rather  than  as  built-in 
factors  that  deserve  to  be  accorded  full  and  explicit  consideration  in 
each  and  every  development  sector.  Far  from  being  a  factor  of 
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most  if not all all development  endeavours.  We  are  a  long  way  from 
achieving  a  systematized  response  of that sort,  certainly with scope  and 
scale  to match  the  challenge. 
At  the  same  time,  the  Community  and  its member  states  should  do 
more  to coordinate  their policy  an1 planning  responses  on  the population 
front  with parallel measures  on  the  part of United  Nations  agencies 
(notably  UNFPA  and  UNICEF),  the  World  Bank  group  among  other 
multilateral  development  banks,  and  numerous  NGO  bodies  that  have  long 
been  active  in  the  field,  in  order  to  generate  a  better  integrated 
strategy.  This  applies  too  at  the  individual  country  level  via 
agency/government  development  dialogues. 
To  cite a  specific  instance of incisive intervention available,  the 
Community  should consider  the  opportunity  to  deploy  leadership now  that 
the  United  States,  formerly  a  front  runner  in the  population field,  has 
partially withdrawn  from  funding  of  family  planning.  U.S.  support  for 
the  two  principal  organizations  in  question,  the  United  Nations 
_Population  Fund  and  the  International Planned Parenthood Federation,  has 
been  suspended  for  several years  and  looks  little likely  to  be  restored 
within  the  forseeable  future.  (In  the  case  of  IPPF,  this  has  meant  an 
annual  shortfall  from  1985  onwards  of  $17  million,  or  one  quarter of 
its income.)  As  a  resul~,  there have  been  severely adverse  repercussions 
for  family  planning efforts  in many  developing nations.  Here,  then,  is 
an  admirable  chance  for  the  Community  to  engage  in  the  more  aggressive 
type  of initiative that is  increasingly demanded  by  a  deteriorating 
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Thus  far  we  have  engaged  in  an  extended  appraisal  of  some 
broad-scope  issues.  Detailed assessment  of  these  issues will  supply 
the  appropriate  policy  framework  for  specific  measures,  six of which  we 
shall now  consider. 
Increased Support  for  Family Planning 
Latest estimates  indicate  that population assistance  from  external 
donors  to  developing nations will have  to be  expanded  from  $630  million 
in  1990  to  as  much  as  $4.5  billion in  2000,  by  comparison  with 
developing-nation  contributions  which  will  need  to  rise  from  $3.5 
billion to  $4.5  billion.  This  means  that  developed-nation  support will 
have  to  be  increased  from  today's  1.3 percent  of total  ODA  to  4  percent 
(still a  trifling proportion  in  light  of  payoffs)  by  the  year  2000. 
(Given  the  expansive  benefits  from  containing  population  growth,  it is 
remarkable  that  developed  nations  have  even  allowed  their  support  to 
fall away  somewhat  in recent years,  from  2.1 percent of  ODA  in the  1970s 
to 1.3 percent  today.)  Nor  should  the  required  increase  be  viewed  as 
costly.  In order to  make  this contribution to attaining the  medium 
population projection of  6.3  billion by  2000,  developed-world  taxpayers  -
would have  to provide no  more  than one  U.S.  cent per day  (Potts,  1990). 
As  a  measure  of what  can be  achieved  on  the  family  planning  front, 
note  the  recent  record of Thailand.  In 1969  the fertility rate was  6.5, 
which  dropped to  3.2  in 1978,  2.3  in 1984  and  2.1  in 1989.  Bad  the 
government  not  implemented  its  National  Family  Planning  Programme,  the 
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(Bennett et al.,  1990). 
Unmet  Needs  in Family  Planning 
Another  policy option lies with  "unmet  needs"  as  concerns  family 
planning.  The  term  refers  to  the  needs  of  those  women  who  possess  the 
motivation  for  family  planning  but  lack  the  birth-control facilities. 
Women  with  these  unmet  needs  are  estimated  to  total between  25  and  50 
percent  of  developing-nation  women  of  reproductive  age  (the  range 
reflects  different nations),  total  of  at  least  300  million  (Westoff, 
1991).  As  a  result  of  these  unmet  needs,  one  birth in  five  in 
developing nations  is considered to be  unwanted  (Sadik,  1992).  Insofar 
as  it is  a  United  Nations-recognized  right  for  parents  to  have  as  many 
or  as  few  children  as  they  desire,  they  should  be  supplied  with 
contraceptive  facilities  on humanitarian  grounds  alone,  even if there 
were  no  population problem.  A policy initiative along these lines would 
cut  the  eventual global  population by  well  over  2  billion  (Bongaarts, 
1990). 
Reducing Child Mortality 
For  those  women  who  lack motivation,  a  sound  response  is  to  reduce 
child mortality  totalling  14  million per  year.  True,  this  would 
increase  population  growth--but  only  temporarily,  and  necessarily. 
Until  parents  can  be  assured  their children are  more  likely to  survive, 
they  will  keep  on  producing  as  many  as  they  can  by  way  of  insurance. 
Through  mass  immunization  campaigns  and  counter-diarrhoea  therapies,  we 
can  save  at  least  9  million  of  those  children  today,  and  still more  in 
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at-risk children to  increase.  If much  of  the extra cost  were  again 
covered  by  developed-world  taxpayers,  it would  amount  to  only  one  U.S. 
cent  per week.  As  in many  cases  of  population-related  issues,  the 
question is not  "How  can  we  afford  to  do  it some  day?",  it is  "How  can 
we  possibly  afford not  to  do  it right  away?"  So  effective  are  the 
preventive measures,  and  so practicable is their  pr~vision,  that we  have 
already  reduced  the  annual  toll by  3  million in just the  past  few  years. 
But  much  greater opportunity lies ahead.  During  the  1990s  we  could 
easily save  a  total of  100 million children.  This  is  a  super-scale 
opportunity  that has  been  extended  to  no  other  human  generation  in  the 
past. 
Enhancing  The  Status  of Women 
A still more  important  component  in population planning is 
enhancement  of the  status of women.  Without  this,  the  specific measures 
listed above  will avail  only  a  fraction of what  they  could.  Women  need 
to  enjoy  far  better opportunities  for health,  education  and  employment, 
to  attain  a  rightful  social  standing  in  society,  and  to  play  their 
proper  part  in  development  activities  generally.  Of  course,  women 
should be  enabled to enjoy their full  share of development benefits  as  a 
simple  matter of equity.  But  their present  disadvantaged  status  is all 
the  more  regrettable  in that  they  plainly  occupy  a  central position in 
the  population  sphere,  as  well  as  in  numerous  development  sectors 
(Leslie and Paolisso,  1989;  Sadik,  1989;· Smyke,  1991;  Vickers,  1991). 
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as  de  facto  "environmental  managers."  Their  efforts  to  gain  their 
families'  livelihoods  mean  they  are  often  more  closely  involved  with 
environmental  resources  (soil,  water,  forests  and  the  like)  as  well  as 
with  the  management  of  household  water,  sanitation  and  domestic  waste, 
than are  men  (Dankelman  and  Davidson,  1989;  Rodda,  1991).  In several 
areas  of  sub-Saharan Africa,  women  are  responsible  for  up  to  70  percent 
of  the  production,  processing  and  marketing  of  food,  with all  that 
entails  in  terms  of  the  environmental  basis  for  agriculture.  In Kenya, 
they  are  the  chief  participants  in  the  National  Soil  Conservation 
Programme  which  has  resulted  in  the  terracing  of  more  than  360,000 
farms,  or 40  percent of the nation's total. 
At  the  same  time,  women  are  often denied  the  opportunity  to 
contribute  to  sustainable  development  because  they  are  over-burdened 
with bearing  and  rearing  children.  Their  status within  the  community 
tends  to  be  defined  by  their capacity  to  produce  large  families, 
often larger than  they  can  cope  with.  Their  lack of  education and  job 
security,  together with their poor  status generally,  means  there  is 
pressure  for  women  to  marry  early--a  factor  that  further  promotes  high 
fertility,  especially in nations  where  family  income  is  supported  by  -
children's  labour. 
Above  all,  these measures  are valid in their own  right and  should 
be  supplied on basic humanitarian grounds. 
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Population growth is most  pronounced  among  the  most  impoverished 
communities  who  subsist off a  cash  income  of  less  than  one  dollar  a 
day--and  who  also  tend  to  cause  an  undue  amount  of  environmental 
degradation.  In  major  measure  these  people  have  large  families  as  a 
mode  to counter poverty  (children's  labour on  farms,  "insurance"  against 
old age).  So  the population problem can also be  tackled through a  direct 
attack on poverty,  which  already  affects  more  than  one  quarter of all 
developing  world  people--and  is  spreading.  The  Community's  development 
policies  in  general  should  be  increasingly  focused  on  these  people  and 
their paramount  needs.  This  will  require  a  shift in  emphasis  to  those 
development  sectors  such  as  subsistence  agriculture  that  have  hitherto 
been  somewhat  neglected insofar as  they  lie outside  the  cash  economy. 
The  spinoff  benefits  for  population  planning  can  be  large  indeed,  even 
if mainly  discounted  to  date.  At  the  same  time,  an  attack  on 
poverty would help  the  environmental cause.  Multiple  synergisms  apply. 
Building 2n the  Past  for  ~ More  Expansive  Future 
The  Community  has  engaged  in  some  population activities  that, 
marginal  as  they  may  seem  to  some  observers,  supply  a  basis  for  a 
greatly  expanded  effort  in  the  future.  Population-related  aid  flows 
from  the  eight  largest  Community  donors  totalled  $116  million  in 
1989.Just  three  nations  contributed  $92  million  (79  percent  of  the 
total):  Netherlands  $33  million or  1.3  percent  of  its  ODA,  Germany  $31 
million  or  0.5  percent,  and  United  Kingdom  $28  million  or  1.1  percent. 
These  flows  were  in  line  with  the  average  for  developed  nations  as  a 
whole,  1.3 percent of  ODA  (but note  Norway,  4.7  percent).  Worthy  as 
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of  the  challenge;  and  as  emphasized  above,  they  were  generally  supplied 
as  an  appendage  to  established  development  sectors  rather  than  being 
integrated from  top  to bottom and  from  start to finish. 
More  promisingly,  the  Community  has  directed increased attention to 
issues  of  environment.  A  1989  Cm1ncil  Resolution  dealt  at  length  with 
environmental  problems  and  perspectives.  A  more  recent  Council 
Resolution,  in March  1992,  presenting  a  Community  Programme  of  Policy 
and  Action  in Relation  to  the  Environment  and  Sustainable  Development, 
has  spoken of  the need  for  "global  strategies  ...  (and)  programmes  of 
sustainable  development  particularly  in  the  developing  countries",  and 
"the  promotion  of  policies  and  programmes  designed  to  improve  the 
quality  of  human  life worldwide  through  more  equitable  distribution  of 
natural  resources,  alleviation of poverty,  food  security  and  improved 
health  standards  and  life  expectancy."  An  associated  document  Towards 
Sustainability  (also  March  1992)  has  emphasised  "global  concerns  about 
the  climate  change/deforestation/energy crisis,  (and)  the  seriousness 
and persistence of  problems  of underdevelopment";  and it has  asserted 
"We  recognize  our  special responsibility for  the  environment both to our 
own  citizens  and  to  the  wider world."  These  issues  and  plans  have  been 
further  covered  in  recent  documents  such  as  ~ Common  Platform: 
Guidelines  for  the  Community  for  UNCED  1992,  and  in numerous  statements 
about  the  Community's  development  aid activities  through its ACP  and  ALA 
programmes,  many  of which  now  feature  an' environmental dimension. 
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it ostensibly supposes  that  the  environmental  cause  can be  promoted in a 
"population  vacuum".  Far  from  positing  population  as  central  to  these 
considerations,  the  issue  is  rarely  mentioned;  and  such  population 
measures  as  have  been  undertaken  can  be  characterized  as  ad  hoc 
reactions  rather  than  strategic  responses.  This  postulates  a 
fundamental  expansion  of  the  Community's  policy  purview  to  incorporate 
population  concerns  into  all  development-support  activities.  A 
( 
'  worthwhile  modus  operandi  could  be  developed  in the  form  of  a  follow-up 
to  the  5th Action  Plan,  using  this  document  as  a  "bridge"  to  a 
comprehensive  Population Action Plan. 
A  further useful first-stage  approach  can be  found  in a  recent 
policy  appraisal  by  one  Community  member,  the  United  Kingdom,  entitled 
Population,  Environment  and  Development  (U.K.  Overseas  Development 
Administration,  1991).  This  document  goes  some  way  to  exploring  the 
opportunity  for  greater  emphasis  on  population  as  a  central if not  a 
primarily determinant  factor  in  development  prospects.  But  this  effort 
is  less vigorous  and  incisive  than it might  be:  it fails  to  demonstrate 
a  spirit of  sufficient urgency,  and it does  not  consider,  for  instance, 
the  concealed  costs  of  continued  inadequate  effort  on  the  population 
front.  Nor  does  it specify  how  population  needs  and  opportunities  are 
to be  factored into existing systems  of policy formulation,  planning and 
programming. 
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departure  in  the  population  field.  In  order  to  operationalize  a  new 
focus  on  population needs,  it should: 
--Engage  in  a  full-scale  overhaul  of  its policy  approach  to 
population  issues  in  a  proper  broad  sense,  relating  them  especially  to 
questions  of environment  and  sustainable development  generally; 
--Investigate the  scope  to  integrate population factors  into its 
main  development  programmes,  notably  as  concerns  agriculture,  energy, 
forestry,  health,  employment,  human  settlements  and poverty alleviation; 
--Systematically expand its population efforts  through its specific 
aid programmes  for  the  ACP  and ALA  regions,  in conjunction with parallel 
activities on  the part of other major  sources of development  aid such as 
the other developed nations,  the United Nations  agencies,  the World  Bank 
group  and  NGO  bodies;  and 
--Explicitly appraise  the  Community's  own  long-term self-interest 
in  these  issues,  with  particular  respect  to  its  hopes  for  strengthened 
relationships  with developing  nations  as  concerns  trade,  investment  and 
debt,  and  with  special  regard  to  the  prospect  of  greatly  increased 
international migration. 
Population Policy for Community  Nations 
While  there is an obvious  premium  on expanded population policies 
for  developing nations,  developed nations  might  well  consider their  own 
need  for  population policies.  Should  they  not  decide,  precisely  and 
explicitly,  how  many,  or how  few,  people  they want,  in accord with their 
carrying capacities at specified levels of affluence  and with particular 
technologies  deployed to achieve  that affluence?  Having  determined this 
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target populations  by  a  particular date.  In  surely all cases,  they 
would  find  that  their present  populations  are  too  large  to  sustain 
without  profound  and  often  irremediable  injury  to  ecosystems  both  local 
and worldwide--as  witness  their contribution to  the  problem  of  global 
warming  alone. 
This  policy initiative is  rarely considered.  Indeed,  it is hardly 
ever perceived as  a  worthwhile  option at all.  Not  a  single  developed 
nation has  indicated it wishes  to  reduce  its population growth rate,  let 
alone  to bring the  rate  down  to  zero  by  some  specific  time  (and let 
alone  to  eventually  reduce  it to  a  level  within  sustainable  carrying 
capacity).  The  only policy measures  are actually directed at increasing 
the population growth rate in a  few  nations;  France,  Italy and Germany, 
for  instance,  want  to  increase  their  fertility.  They  do  this  on  the 
grounds  that  they  fear  the  "greying"  of  their populations,  meaning  that 
as  their populaces  grow  older  (due  largely to  increased  longevity), 
there will be  an unprecedently  large  number  of people  in the  retired-
from-work  and  hence  unproductive  categories,  especially  in  relation  to 
the  number  in  the  productive  categories  (Ward,  1990).  It is  projected 
that by  2030  the European Community  will feature  one  pensioner for every 
three  workers,  meaning  that  workers  will  have  to  contribute 
proportionately more  to  state pension funds. 
Certainly these  are  legitimate concerns.  But  there  are  counter-
measures  apart  from  increasing the  work  force.  There  could  be  emphasis 
on  quality  as  well  as  quantity of workers;  and  as  people  remain  healthy 
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and active  into their later years,  the  retirement  age  could be  extended. 
In  any  case,  the  longer  the  issue  is  deferred,  the  more  of  a  problem it 
will  become.  Measures  to  increase  fertility  as  an  interim  expedient 
merely  postpone  and aggravate  the  day  of reckoning. 
But while  this demographic  question deserves  to be  addressed,  it is 
hardly ever  raised,  even  though  an implicit answer  is being continuously 
supplied by  the  Community's  use--often mis-use  and  over-use--of its 
environmental  resource  base,  increasingly with  spillover consequences 
for all other nations.  The  problem is being  resolved  by  default  rather 
than  by  design.  Since  it is  built  into  developed-world  people's 
affluent lifestyles,  should  these  nations  not  move  from  implicit action 
(or  inaction)  to explicit  response  as  concerns  their population  growth? 
Fortunately  this  population  growth  problem  could  often  be  resolved 
through  a  simple  expedient:  eliminate all unwanted births. 
True,  some  observers  assert  that  labour  shortages  can be  met  by 
immigrants.  This  could be  a  valid response  so  long  as  mass  immigration 
does  not  generate  social tensions  and cultural conflict.  But  the  debate 
on  immigration policy is generally pursued with little reference  to 
population policy,  even  though  the  two  are  implicitly  and  intimately 
related. 
9.  Immigration and Environmental Refugees 
Immigration  from  developing nations,  both legal and illegal,  is  a 
major  concern of  the  European  Community.  And  rightly  so:  already  there 
are  substantial numbers  of immigrants  within the Community,  estimated to 
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total  15  million  legal  entrants  and  5  million  illegal,  many  of  them 
from  developing nations  in North  Africa  and  the  eastern Mediterranean 
(Kuijsten,  1991;  Loescher,  1989).  France,  with  11  percent  of  its 
population  made  up  of  immigrants,  is  struggling  to  integrate  4  million 
arrivals  from  North  Africa,  notably  in  those  localities  that  are 
becoming  predominantly Muslim. 
Some  observers  suppose  the  biggest  source  of  immigrants  in the 
immediate  future will be  Eastern Europe.  But  in the  longer  term,  the 
great  bulk will  surely  stem  from  developing  nations  (Tapinos,  1990). 
The  present  situation,  let alone  the  future  outlook,  is  giving  much 
concern  to  the  main nations  of entry,  viz.  Spain,  Italy and  Greece.  It 
is  also  leading  to  a  good  deal  of  political discord  in e.g.  France  and 
Germany  that  ostensibly  fear  "swamping  waves"  of  immigrants  as  adverse 
economic  and  environmental  factors  in developing  nations,  aggravated  by 
population  pressures,  foster  fast-growing  multitudes  of  future 
immigrants.  In  just North  Africa  and  the  eastern Mediterranean, 
population  growth,  allied with  economic  hardship  and  massive 
unemployment,  threatens  to  persuade  far  larger  numbers  of  would-be 
migrants  to  look  toward  Europe.  In  developing  nations  of  the 
Mediterranean there are  195 million people  today,  projected to  reach 291 
million  by  2010  (a  49-percent  increase)  and  384  million  by  2025 
(97  percent).  This  latter total is  39  million more  than  the entire 
populace  of the  European  Community  today. 
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The  proper policy  response  is to promote  sustainable  development  in 
nations  concerned.  In particular,  an  enhanced  effort  should  be  mounted 
in the nations  of North Africa,  with  emphasis  on  both environment  and 
population  programmes.  This  would  surely  prove  more  cost  effective  in 
the  long  run  than  measures  to  accomodate  many  millions  of  unwanted 
immigrants  into Europe  from  North Africa.  True,  there will  be  some 
opportunity  to  draw  on  North  Afri~an immigrants  to  supply  labour  needs 
in the  Community.  The  work  force  of Western Europe  is projected to fall 
by  14.5 million by  2025,  and  the  work  force  of  North  Africa  to  grow  by 
56.6  million  (Sadik,  1992).  But  even  if North  Africa's  economies  grow 
in  a  manner  to  absorb  many  more  workers,  the  number  of workless  people 
in North Africa is inevitably going to be  many  more  than can be  absorbed 
by  Europe  (their present  GNPs  are  only  3  percent  those  of  Community 
nations).  The  answer is to provide  them with motivation to  stay at home 
by  virtue  of  expanded  employment  opportunities  through  sustainable 
development.  A parallel answer is to  engage  in population planning of a 
scale to  reduce  the projected total of work-seeking North Africans. 
Much  the  same  applies  to  other developing nations  adjacent  to 
Europe,  viz.  those  of  the  eastern Mediterranean.  Not  that  immigration 
pressures  are  likely  to  be  confined  to  the  Mediterranean  basin,  though 
these  enjoy  the  easiest  access  to  Europe.  As  international  travel 
becomes  cheaper  and  disadvantaged  communities  increase  in numbers  in 
more  distant  lands  such  as  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  the  Indian  sub-
continent,  these  could  well  be  a  growing  source  of  would-be  immigrants 
too.  Already  there  is  reportedly a  total of  400,000  immigrants,  half of 
them illegal,  from  sub-Saharan Africa in Italy alone. 
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warming,  working  in synergistic accord with other environmental  problems 
plus  fast-growing  population pressures,  will  precipitate migration  that 
could  eventually  entail  hundreds  of  millions  of  people  from  developing 
nations  (Myers,  1993;  and  see  Appendix  7).  This  places all the  greater 
premium  on  anticipatory  action  to  not  only  stem  global  warming  and 
reduce  population growth,  but  to establish solid development  foundations 
in developing nations  so that their citizens will enjoy greater capacity 
to  cope  with global warming  without  recourse  to international migration. 
10.  The  Ethical Dimension 
It is fitting to conclude with what  could eventually turn out  to be 
the  biggest  policy  determinant  of all.  In  the  Introduction  we  noted 
that a  prime motivation for  the European Community  to support developing 
nations  lies with humanitarian concerns.  This  potent  issue  reaches 
beyond  real-politik factors.  It postulates  that  we  not  only exist as 
members  of  individual nations  and  communities.  We  are all participants 
in the  common  human  enterprise  that  encompasses  people  right  around  the 
world.  "Seek not  to know  for  whom  the  bell tolls,  it tolls  for  thee" 
(John  ~onne).  This  is all the more  pertinent for  the  European Community 
in that,  being one  of the most  affluent societies that have  ever existed 
on Earth,  it bears  a  responsibility  for  the  disadvantaged majority  of 
humankind. 
There  is  a  further ethical aspect to policy.  It reflects the  long-
term  repercussions  of  our  environmental  assaults  on  the  biosphere 
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(Bourdeau  et al.,  1989;  Norton,  1987).  We  are  currently  polluting  our 
ecosystems  on  a  scale  that,  if the  pollution were  to  be  suddenly 
terminated  in,  say,  the year 2010,  the  length of  time  needed  for natural 
processes  and  human  efforts  to  make  good  the  damage  would  certainly  be 
many  decades.  If we  were  to  stop  the  spread  of  deserts  in the  year 
2010,  it would  take  at least a  century  to  push  them  back  again;  and  the 
same  to  allow the  ozone  layer to  recover.  Soil erosion would  require 
several centuries  before  soil  stocks  could  be  replenished;  and  much  the 
same  would  apply  to tropical deforestation and  global warming.  All 
these  restorative  efforts  would  be  needed  to  compensate  for 
environmental  injuries  imposed mainly within half a  century. 
The  biggest biospheric  impoverishment  lies with mass  extinction of 
species.  Evolution will eventually generate  a  replacement  stock of 
species  to match today's .in abundance  and variety.  But  so  far as  we  can 
discern  from  recovery  periods  in  the  wake  of  mass  extinctions  in  the 
prehistoric past,  the  "bounce  back"  phase  will certainly extend  for  5 
million  years--or  20  times  longer  than  humankind  has  existed  as  a 
species. 
In effect,  leaders  and  citizens  of  the  present  generation are 
taking  decisions  that  will  profoundly  affect  many  generations  into  the 
future.  No  human  community  in  the  past has  wielded  such  capacity  to 
impoverish  communities  that  come  after.  Nor  has  any  community  of  the 
past  possessed  such  capacity  to  safeguard  the  planet  at  a  time  of 
unprecedented  threat.  This  prospect  demands  an  unprecedented  response 
on the part of policy makers. 
74 ( 
Chapter V 
CONCLUSION 
"War  is often thought of in terms of military conflict,  or 
even  annihilation.  But  there  is a  growing  awareness  that  an 
equal  danger might  be  chaos--as  a  result of mass  hunger, 
economic disaster,  environmental  catastrophes  and terrorism. 
So  we  should not  think  only of reducing  the  traditional 
threats of peace,  but also of the  need for change  from  chaos 
to order." 
Willy Brandt,  1989 
This  paper has  demonstrated  there  are multiple  interacting factors 
of  environment  and  population  that  reduce  developing nations'  hopes  for 
sustainable  development.  What--to  return  to  the  primary  rationale  for 
this paper--is the  interest of the European Community  in these  problems? 
Envisage  a  future  where  the  problems  persist,  stalling sustainable 
development.  The  overall  outcome  could  be  a  continuing  downward  spiral 
of poverty in many  developing nations,  associated with deficits of  food, 
energy  and water,  plus  urban  squalor  and widespread  unemployment.  In 
turn,  these  factors  could  precipitate  economic  stagnation,  social 
frustration,  political  upheaval,  and  even  government  paralysis  or 
collapse. 
What  happens  when  the negative  cycle  takes hold in nations  that are 
important  to the  European Community  by  reason of aid,  trade,  investment, 
political affinity,  strategic  location and  security interests?  The 
Community  could  find  itself  increasingly  beset  by  requests  for  further 
aid  and  humanitarian  help.  It  could  even  face  "economic 
aggression"  in  the  form  of  trade  cartels,  market  closures, 
nationalization of assets  and  debt  cancellations.  Were  the  governments 
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of beleaguered nations  to  seek  to  relieve their domestic  tensions at any 
cost,  they  could  become  increasingly inclined to over-exploit  their 
environmental  resources  in order  to  meet  immediate  threats.  Further, 
they  could  become  characterized by  autocratic  and  repressive  regimes, 
and  build  up  their military  to  contain  internal  conflicts  or  resort  to 
excessive  international assertiveness  to  gain  leverage  abroad.  If many 
other developing nations  followed suit,  widespread political instability 
could severely undermine  the  interests of the  European Community  as  well 
as  those  of other developed nations.  We  cannot  predict exactly how 
these  factors  will interact,  or how  far--in light of  the  global  traffic 
in arms,  the  prevalence  of terrorism and  the  proliferation of nuclear 
devices--they will  lead  to violence.  But  it is  realistic  to  suppose 
that  tensions  and  conflicts,  whether  domestic  or international,  could 
easily escalate  and multiply.  They  could  even  destabilize  the  emergent 
new  world order. 
The  fact  that it is often difficult for  us  to  perceive all the 
linkages  between  increase  in human  numbers  and  decline  in environmental 
security on  the  one  hand,  and  rise  in instability and violence  on  the 
other hand,  may  tell us  less  about  the nature of the  linkages  than about 
our  limited capacity  to  think  concisely  and  systematically  about 
population  and  environmental  concerns  that  have  often fallen  outside 
policy makers'  purview.  Those  connections  that are  more  apparent  may 
not  lend  themselves  to  quantification,  by  contrast  with  "conventional" 
connections  that  are  readily measureable  and  thereby  carry  greater 
weight  with  policy makers.  We  should not  be  preoccupied with  what  can 
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be  counted  to  the  detriment  of  what  also  counts.  In  the  case  of 
linkages  that  are  difficult  even  to  identify  and  define,  we  should 
remember  that,  as  in other  situations  of uncertainty  where  a  negative 
outcome  carries  unusually  severe  penalties,  it will  be  better  for  us  to 
find  we  have  been vaguely  right  than precisely wrong. 
However  multi-faceted,  subtle  and difficult  to  discern are  these 
linkages  between developing nations  and  the  European Community,  they are 
real  and  significant--and  they  are  growing  more  numerous  and 
influential.  Fortunately  they  are  all  amenable  to  remedial  measures 
through  policy  interventions,  provided  they  are  recognized  in  due  time 
and with attention to their true  extent.  The  key  question is whether 
the  European  Community will  recognize  its interests in their proper 
scope,  and  respond accordingly.  The  Community will have  to  respond 
sooner  or  later:  either  sooner,  through  cooperative  measures  of 
sufficient  scope,  or  later,  through  measures  to  grapple  with  the 
problems  of an  indivisibly  ~poverished world. 
This  is all the  more  pertinent in light of  the  expanded  leadership 
role within  the  global  arena  that  is  becoming  increasingly available  to 
the  European  Community  as  a  geopolitical  force.  As  the  Community  moves 
to  safeguard its interests in developing nations,  it will need to engage 
in  a  growing  array  of  collaborative  endeavours.  As  more  and  more 
nations  come  to  recognize  their  interest  in  the  common  global 
environment,  the attack on collective problems  through collective effort 
should gather momentum.  This  collective  approach places  a  premium  on 
leadership--an  ingredient  that  is all  the  more  significant  in  light  of 
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the  pre-eminent  scientific  skills,  technological  know-how,  political 
acumen  and  financial  resources  of  the  European  Community.  The  last 
item,  reflecting  the  Community's  economic  prowess,  is  particularly 
pertinent.  In any  case,  it need not  cost  the  Earth  to  save  the  Earth; 
indeed,  because  of  growing  interdependency  relationships  between  the 
Community  and  developing nations,  support  for  developing  nations  will 
prove  to  be  a  singularly profitable  investment all  round.  Although 
certain rich nations  protest  they  have  never  been poorer,  it is  time  to 
recognize  that developing-world poverty has  become  a  luxury  we  can  no 
longer afford. 
When  faced with crises,  policy makers  can do  more  than  react.  They 
can turn crises to  advantage.  As  old presuppositions  and  the  policy 
regimes  they  supported are  overtaken by  events,  the process  opens  up  new 
opportunities  for exceptionally creative initiative.  What  may  now  be 
seen as politically impossible  could  soon become  politically imperative. 
There  is a  growing  convergence  between the  idealistic and  the  realistic. 
Let  us  bear  in mind  the  most  over-riding  factor  of all.  Change 
will come,  whether we  positively pursue it or not,  whether it arrives  by 
design or by  default.  Fortunately  there  is still time--though  only  just 
time--to choose  the  courses preferred.  Through urgent  and  incisive 
action,  the European Community  can generate  a  sizeable payoff for itself 
as  it moves  to  safeguard its stake  in the  global  environment  and  in the 
population issues  involved. 
78 Appendix 1 
THE  AGRICULTURAL  RESOURCE  BASE  IN  DEVELOPING  NATIONS 
In  31  developing nations,  agriculture  accounts  for  30  percent  or 
more  of  GOP,  by  contrast with.3 .percent  in  the  United  States.  These 
nations  also  feature  high  population  growth  rates  (2.4  percent  or  more 
per year)  and  low  incomes  (per-capita  GOP  below  $500).  So  they  are 
caught  in  the  double  bind  of  having  to  depend  heavily  upon  their 
natural-resource  base  to  feed  their  fast-growing  numbers  while  lacking 
revenues  to  engage  in  conservation  of  the  natural-resource  base  and  to 
make  their agriculture more  productive  (while  of course  lacking  the 
means  to  purchase  food  elsewhere)  (van  den  Oever,  1992). 
In developing  Asia,  agriculture  accounts  for  70  percent  of 
employment  (by  contrast with  only  12  percent  in  Japan).  Exports  based 
on natural  resources  amount  to  40  percent  of all exports  (World  Bank, 
1988).  In Central  America,  which  is  economically  more  advanced  than 
Asia,  agriculture,  together  with  other  sectors  based  on  natural 
resources  such  as  forestry  and  fisheries,  account  for  more  than half  of 
all employment  and for  the  bulk of export earnings  (Leonard,  1986). 
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Appendix I 
CARRYING  CAPACITY:  THE  CASE  OF  KENYA 
Kenya's  present population of  25  million people  is  projected  to 
expand  to  113  million by  the  time  zero  growth  is attained at  some  stage 
in the  22nd  century.  Yet  even if the  nation were  to  employ  Western 
Europe's  high-technology  agriculture,  it could not  support  more  than  52 
million  people  off its  land  resources  (Harrison,  1984)--and  even  if it 
were  to  achieve  the  two-child  family  forthwith,  the  population  would 
still double  because  of  demographic  momentum  (51  percent  of  Kenyans  are 
age  15  or under,  meaning that proportionately large numbers  of potential 
parents are already in place).  So  Kenya  will have  to depend  on steadily 
increasing  amounts  of  food  from  outside  to  support  itself.  But  in part 
because  of its high population  growth  rate,  3.8  percent,  its per-capita 
economic  growth  is only 1.9 percent.  Moreover  Kenya's  terms  of  trade 
have  been  declining  throughout  the  1980s,  and  they  are  barely  positive 
today  (World  Bank,  1991).  So  Kenya  faces  the  prospect  of diminishing 
financial  reserves  to purchase  food  abroad.  Its export  economy  will 
have  to  permanently  flourish  in  a  manner  it has  never  achieved  to  date 
if the nation is  to  be  able  to  buy  enough  food  to meet  its ever-growing 
needs. 
Kenya  shows  many  signs,  then,  of  already being in an  "overshoot" 
situation as  concerns  its carrying  capacity.  The  time  to  tackle  the 
situation was  during the  far-back  period when  its population was  only 
starting to  grow  rapidly--and all  seemed  well  in  terms  of  its capacity 
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to  feed itself for  a  while.  The  source  of its population  dilemma  was 
becoming  entrenched.  Other nations with currently satisfactory capacity 
to  ensure  their  food  supplies  might  ponder  Kenya's  experience.  The  main 
opportunity for  Kenya  to  relieve  its situation lies with  an  immediate 
and  vigorous  effort  to  slow  its  population  growth.  Were  the  two-child 
to  be  achieved  in  2010  instead  of  the  projected  2035,  Kenya's  ultimate 
population could be  held to  72  million,  41  million less  than expected 
(McNamara,  1991). 
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CFC  PRODUCTION  AND  CONSUMPTION:  THE  CASE  OF  CHINA 
Much  of  the  developing nations'  growing  demand  for  cooling 
chemicals  is  centred  on  refrigerators,  this  being  the  largest  and 
fastest-expanding  use  of  CFCs  in  developing  nations.  China  intends  to 
greatly  increase  its  stock  of  refrigerators;  to  date  only  one 
household in ten possesses  a  refrigerator.  The  nation has  built 12  CFC-
(- production plants  in order to  accommodate  the  refrigerator needs  of many 
more  of  today's  250  million households  (a  figure  that  reflects  China's 
huge  population).  By  the  year  2000  refrigerants  production  is  to  be 
expanded  ten-fold,  which  will still leave  per-capita  output  only  one 
fifth that  of  the  United  States.  But  China's  vast  human  numbers--1.15 
billion  today,  growing  by  16  million  a  year--would  make  the 
refrigerants'  impact,  if based  on  CFCs,  a  critical factor for the  ozone 
layer  (Isaksen et al.,  1990).  Fortunately  China  (also  another  major 
producer and consumer of refrigerants,  India)  has  recently indicated its 
readiness  to join in the Montreal  and Helsinki initiatives and  follow-up 
measures  to  reduce  CFC  production. 
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THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY:  IMPACT  OF  POPULATION  GROWTH 
The  European  Community  nations  feature  little population growth  as 
compared  with  developing  nations  (Table  2).  But  it  is  not 
insignificant,  especially  not  when  allied with  a  high  rate  of  resource 
consumption  and negligent  technology.  To  give  an  idea  of  the  impact  of 
a  growth  rate  of  around  0.5  percent  and  producing  an  extra  700,000 
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\  Community  citizens per year,  note  that according  to  the  analyses  of 
Harrison  (1992),  population  growth  in  developed  nations  as  a  whole  (of 
which  the  Community  comprises  28  percent  of  today's  populations)  has 
caused: 
--a 59-percent  increase  in livestock numbers  during  the  period 
1961-85,  contributing to soil erosion and methane  emissions  among 
other environmental problems  (the  remaining  41  percent has  been 
due  to increased consumption); 
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--a 21-percent  increase  in fertilizer use  during the period 1961-
88,  leading to water pollution and global warming;  and 
--a 35-percent  increase  in carbon dioxide  emissions  during  the 
period 1960-88,  contributing to global warming. 
These  figures  demonstrate  the  sizeable  impact  of  even  a  small 
population  of  growth  when  working  in  conjunction with  high  levels  of 
consumption. 
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Appendix  5 
ENVIRONMENTAL  DISCONTINUITIES 
Environmental  discontinuities  can  occur  in many  forms.  Consider 
the  case  of  fuelwood,  bearing  in mind  that  most  people  in  developing 
nations  derive  their energy  from  fuelwood.  A  salient  consequence  of 
deforestation  (see  Chapter III)  is  shortage  of  fuelwood.  In 1980,  1.2 
billion people  were  meeting  their  fuelwood  needs  only  by  cutting wood 
faster  than it was  being  replenished by  natural  growth;  and  112  million 
people  could not meet  even minimum  needs  without  over-harvesting stocks. 
By  the  year  2000,  2.5 billion people,  or  around half of all developing-
nation people,  are  projected to be  gaining their  supplies  only  by  over-
harvesting,  and  350  million  people  will  be  facing  absolute  shortages 
(Postel  and Heise,  1988). 
Now  visualize  a  situation where  a  stock  of  this  potentially 
renewable  resource  can  suddenly  become  overwhelmed  by  rapid  population 
growth.  As  long  as  the  number  of  wood  collectors  in  a  particular 
locality  does  not  exceed  the  capacity  of  their  tree  stock  to  replenish 
itself  through  regrowth,  the  community  can  exploit  the  resource 
indefinitely.  The  community  may  keep  on  increasing  in  numbers  for 
decades,  indeed centuries,  and all is well  provided it does  not  surpass 
a  critical level of exploitation.  But  what  if the  number  of collectors 
grows  and  grows  until they  finally  exceed  the  self-renewing  capacity  of 
the  trees--perhaps  exceeding it by  only  a  small  amount?  Quite  suddenly 
a  point is  reached where  the  tree  stock  starts  to decline.  Season  by 
season  the  self-renewing  capacity  becomes  ever-more  depleted:  the 
84 exploitation  load  remains  the  same,  and  so  the  resource  keeps  on 
dwindling  more  and  more--meaning  in  turn  there  is  an  ever-increasing 
overloading  of  the  resource.  The  vicious  circle  is  set  up,  and  it 
proceeds  to  tighten,  when  once  the  level of exploitation becomes  non-
linear. 
Note  in particular that this  scenario applies  even if the  number  of 
collectors  stops  growing.  The  damage  is  done.  But  if the  number  of 
collectors  continues  to  expand  through  population  growth,  the  double 
degree  of overloading  (derived from  an ever-dwindling stock exploited by 
ever-more  collectors)  becomes  compounded.  There  ensues  a  positive 
feedback  process  that  leads  to  fuelwood  scarcity,  and  then all  too 
quickly  the  stock  is  depleted  toward  zero.  It is  a  process  that  occurs 
all the  more  rapidly as  the  stock is progressively depleted. 
The  essence  of  the  situation is that  the  pace  of critical change 
can  be  rapid  indeed.  As  soon  as  a  factor  of  absolute  scale  comes  into 
play,  the  self-sustaining equilibrium becomes  disrupted.  A situation 
that  seemed  as  if it could  persist  into  the  indefinite  future  suddenly 
moves  on  to  an  altogether different  status.  It is as  if two  lines  on  a 
graph  approach  each other with  seeming  indifference  to  each  other,  then 
when  once  they cross  the  situation is radically transformed. 
We  encounter this non-linear  relationship  between  resource 
exploitation  and  population  growth  with  respect  to  many  other  resource 
stocks,  notably soil cover,  fisheries,  water  supplies  and pollution-
absorbing  services  of  the  atmosphere  (Keyfitz,  1991).  Whereas  resource 
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exploitation  may  have  been  growing  gradually  for  very  long  periods 
without  any  great harm,  the  switch in scale  of  exploitation induced 
through  a  phase  of unusually  rapid population  growth  can  readily  result 
in a  slight initial exceeding  of  the  sustainable yield,  whereupon  the 
debacle  of  resource  depletion  is  precipitated  with  surprising 
rapidity. 
Certain resource  shortages  are  likely to interact with each other 
in a  manner  to produce  a  mutually  amplifying  impact.  That  is  to  say, 
the  compounded  product will be  greater than the  sum  of separate  impacts. 
Indeed  a  synergized  interaction  can  be  an  order  of  magnitude  more 
powerful  than the  simple  sum  of individual  outcomes.  Consider,  for 
example,  the  agricultural  sphere  in relation  to  genetic  depletion.  The 
higher  temperatures  and  reduced  soil moisture  expected  in a  greenhouse-
affected world will not  be  appropriate  for  most  crops,  in that  they  are 
finely  tuned  to current climatic  regimes.  Hence  the  need  to  expand  the 
genetic  support  for  our  crops  will  place  a  premium  on  germplasm 
variability  to  build  up  drought  resistance  among  other  environmental 
adaptations.  Yet  the  gene  reservoirs  for  crop  plants  are  being  more 
rapidly  depleted  than  ever,  leaving  a  severely  reduced  genetic  resource 
base.  Moreover,  by  the  time  we  need  the  extra genetic variability to 
breed  drought  resistance,  etc.,  into  our  crops,  there  are  likely  to  be 
twice  as  many  people  to feed. 
Also  in the agriculture  sector and with respect to the  reduction 
of biodiversity,  note  that the  number  of  insect and mite  species  that 
now  qualify  as  agricultural  pests  is  about  9000.  Many  potential  pests, 
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tens  of  thousands  more,  are held in check  through natural  enemies  in the 
form  of  insect  predators  and  parasites.  It is  these  predators  and 
parasites,  many  of  them  unusually  susceptible  to  summary  extinction, 
that  will  be  tend  to  be  preferentially  eliminated  during  the  mass 
extinction of  species  now  underway.  As  a  result,  we  may  well  witness  a 
swift increase  in pest depradations  on  food  crops--again,  at a  time  when 
there will be  many  more  people  to  feed. 
When  we  consider all environmental  disruptions  together,  plus  the 
impacts  of  population  growth,  there  is  potentially  a  multitude  of 
synergistic  interactions  that could have  marked  adverse  impact.  As  a 
result,  there  is  good  reason  for  us  to  anticipate  a  greater 
environmental  debacle,  arriving more  rapidly,  than is usually predicted. 
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Appendix  ~ 
GLOBAL  WARMING 
We  have  seen in Chapter II that population  growth  plays  a  sizeable 
role  in global  warming  processes.  If there  had  been  no  population 
growth,  there would have  been  far  less  buildup  of  carbon  dioxide.  But 
how  much  less?  Is  it more  or  less  the  amount  suggested  by  the 
calculation presented?  What  if economic  growth  patterns  had  worked  out 
differently,  with  alternative  levels  of  demand  for  fossil-fuel 
energy--especially insofar as  a  greater proportion of the  reduced  growth 
would  presumably have  taken  place  in  industrialized nations?  What  if 
the  growth  in  energy  demand  and  the  technology  deployed  to  meet  it had 
worked  out in a  manner  that meant  greater per-capita consumption because 
of shifts in e.g.  pricing patterns  and trends?  There  is a  host of these 
"what  if"  questions  that  can  be  raised about  the  analysis,  showing  that 
it is far  from  so clear cut as  might  appear at first glance.  Moreover it 
says  nothing about  the  sectors  of  the  world  populace  that have  been 
contributing more  than others.  A  disaggregated analysis  would  present 
a  much  more  revealing picture. 
The  global-warming  potential  of  future  population  growth  is 
exemplified  by  the  case  of  India.  With  a  current  per-capita  income  of 
only  $330  per  year,  i.e.  about  one-sixtieth  that  of  the  United  States, 
India's electricity capacity  today  is  only  55,000  megawatts,  roughly 
twice  that  of  New  York  State.  Although  the  country  possesses  only 
moderate  coal  reserves,  it is exploiting  them  so  fast  that it now  ranks 
as  the world's  fourth coal burner.  In 1950  its coal use  was  only  33 
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million  tonnes,  but  by  1989  it had  soared  to  191  million  tonnes  (while 
production of  crude  oil,  another  fossil  fuel,  rose  from  0.3  million 
tonnes  to 30.4 million tonnes;  and  total power  generation increased  from 
5  billion kwh  to  217  billion kwh)  (Dave,  1988).  The  government  plans  a 
number  of  energy-based  initiatives  for  development;  for  instance,  to 
supply  electricity to half  the  houses  in  the  country.  This  goal  alone 
will  require  the  production of  an  additional  80,000  megawatts  of  power, 
by  comparison  with  the  present  total  capacity  of  55,000  megawatts.  It 
is anticipated that this measure,  together with other development plans, 
will shortly induce  a  doubling of India's carbon emissions. 
Within this context  a  paramount  factor lies with population,  both 
its  size  and  growth  rate.  India's  present  population  of  877  million 
people,  growing at 2.0 percent per year,  is projected to  reach 1,043 
million by  the  year  2000  and  1,375  million  by  2020.  Even  with  its  low 
per-capita  income  (the  C  factor  of  the I= PCT  equation),  and  its less-
than-advanced  technological  capacity  (the  T  factor),  India's  huge 
population  (the  P  factor)  makes  for  a  disproportionately large potential 
contribution to global warming.  But  suppose  India managed  to  reduce  its 
fertility  rate  to  replacement  level  (almost  half  the  present  number  of 
children per completed  family)  within  the  next  three  to  four  decades; 
and  suppose  that at the  same  time  it did no  more  than  double  its per-
capita use  of  commercial  energy  (roughly  matching  that  of  China  today), 
using  coal  for  the  purpose.  This  increase,  given  the multiplier effect 
of  the  huge  present  population  and  its  rate  of  growth,  would  result  in 
India's  emitting carbon dioxide  at an  annual  per-capita rate  of  one 
tonne,  or  roughly  the  world  average  in 1990.  Because  of  the  population 
89 factor,  this  would  still be  enough  to  more  than  cancel  out  the  benefits 
of  a  putatively  extreme  step elsewhere,  viz.  the  termination  forthwith 
of all coal  burning  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  without  replacing 
it with any  other carbon-containing fuel  (Ehrlich and Ehrlich,  1990). 
Fortunately there is much  scope  to contain carbon dioxide  emissions 
through  across-the-board  implementation  of  energy  efficiency  and  energy 
conservation measures--provided  the  appropriate policies are  set in 
(  place.  According  to  analyses  of  the  Rocky  Mountain  Institute  (Lovins, 
1989;  see  also  Goldemberg  et al.,  1987,  and  Holdren,  1990),  the  2025 
world of  8  billion people  and with  an  economy  five  times  its 1975  level 
could be  supported with only  a  portion of the  energy utilized today. 
So  much  for carbon dioxide.  Let  us  move  on  to another greenhouse 
gas,  methane,  which is  20  times  more  potent,  molecule  for molecule,  than 
carbon  dioxide  as  a  source  of  global  warming.  It is  increasing  more 
rapidly.  It now  accounts  for  18  percent  of  global-warming  processes 
(Table  3).  Half  of all anthropogenic  emissions  of  methane  come  from 
rice paddies  among  other irrigated lands  and  from  ruminant  livestock. 
These  two  sources  have  expanded  mainly  to meet  the  needs  of more  people 
to  feed,  also  due  to  demand  for  improved  diets.  Irrigated lands  have 
increased  by  1.9  percent  per  year  for  much  of  the  period  since  1970, 
roughly  the  same  as  the  rate  of  population  growth;  cattle  numbers  have 
grown  by  0.9  percent  per year,  less  than half  as  much.  The  greatest 
expansion by  far has  occurred in developing countries,  in line with 
their need to  feed  fast-growing  populations.  Their  rate  of methane 
emissions  cannot  be  readily  reduced  (by contrast with  the  case  for 
90 ( 
carbon  dioxide)  on  the  grounds  that  they  do  not  reflect  wasteful 
consumption.  Rather  they  are  likely to  keep  on  expanding  to  stay  apace 
with population growth:  the  IPCC  Working  Group  III Report  projects  a  45-
percent  increase  in meat  and  dairy  production  by  2025,  with  a  parallel 
increase  in methane  emissions.  While  there  are  a  few  technological 
adaptations  that could eventually help  the  situation,  the  most  practical 
long-run way  to  reduce  the  rise  in methane  emissions  from  these  two 
sources  is by  slowing the  growth  in human  numbers  (Harrison,  1992). 
There  is  a  further  aspect  to  the  population/global  warming 
connection that is still more  significant.  It relates  to  the  prospects 
for  agriculture  and  food  supplies  in  a  greenhouse-affected  world. 
Recent  research and  analysis  (Daily  and  Ehrlich,  1990)  have  generated  a 
model  that  calculates  population  size,  and  the  production,  consumption 
and  storage of grain under different climate  scenarios  over  a  20-year 
projection  period.  Grain  supplies  over  half  of  the  calories  in  an 
average  diet  when  consumed  directly,  and  a  substantial part  of  the 
remainder  when  consumed  in the  form  of meat,  eggs  and  dairy products; 
one  tonne  of grain per year  can  provide  four  adults  with  adequate  diets 
and  five  adults with subsistence diets.  Grain also accounts  for  the vast 
majority  of  international  trade  in food.  According  to  the  model  cited, 
each  one  tonne  deficit in grain production results  in  two  deaths--a 
distinctly conservative calculation. 
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The  model  postulates  an  entirely plausible  greenhouse  scenario  for 
early next  century,  in  the  form  of  a  10-percent  reduction  in  the  global 
grain harvest  on  average  three  times  a  decade  (the  1988  droughts  in just 
the  United  States,  Canada  and  China  resulted  in  almost  a  5-percent 
decline).  Given  the  way  the  world's  food  reserves  have  dwindled  almost 
to  nothing  in  recent  years  as  a  result  of  droughts,  it is  not 
unrealistic  to  reckon  (according  to  the  model)  that  each  such  grain-
harvest  shortfall would  result  in the  malnutrition  deaths  of  between  50 
and  400  million people  (Daily  and Ehrlich,  1990). 
In addition,  global warming  may  well  reduce  croplands  by  as  much  as 
one  third  (within  a  range  of  10  to  50  percent),  due  to  increased 
temperatures  and  reduced  rainfall,  plus  coastal  flooding  (Schneider, 
1989;  see also Pimentel et al.,  1990).  Global warming's  impact  could be 
specially  severe  in developing  lands  of  the  tropics,  since  they  tend  to 
be  more  vulnerable  to  climatic  change.  Moreover,  developing  countries 
have  next  to  no  food  reserves  for  the  most  part,  and  their citizens 
often subsist off marginal diets already.  Worst  of all,  these countries 
have  all  too  limited capital  and  infrastructure  with  which  to  adapt  to 
changing climate.  Yet  according to  the  1990  IPCC  Report,  the  regions 
that  appear  to  be  at greatest  risk of  extreme  climatic  dislocations  for 
agriculture  are  often  those  where  marginal  environments  sometimes  make 
agriculture  an  insecure  enterprise  already:  the  Sahel,  southern Africa, 
the  Indian sub-continent,  eastern Brazil  and  Mexico.  Latest climatic 
models  show  patterns  of  drought  increasing  in  frequency  from  5  percent 
of  the  time  under  the  present  climate  to  50  percent  by  the  year  2050 
(Houghton et al.,  1990;  see also Rosenzweig  and Parry,  1992). 
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On  top  of all this,  the  leading grain producers  in the  developed 
world  are  North  America,  Europe  and  Australia,  also  Ukraine  and  Russia, 
accounting  for  well  over  40  percent  of  global  grain  production.  Yet 
precisely  these  regions  (except  possibly Australia)  could  well  incur 
relative·ly  more  severe  climatic  consequences  in  a  greenhouse-affected 
world.  Even if one  allows  for  a  "fertilizer effect"  on grain production 
as  a  consequence  of  enhanced  carbon dioxide  levels  in the  atmosphere, 
leading to  5  to  10 percent increases  in grain production every  3  to  5 
years,  this  does  not prevent  the  projected deaths  of  over  800  million 
people  during  a  20-year period  (Daily and Ehrlich,  1990). 
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ENVIRONMENTAL  REFUGEES 
Global  warming  is likely to engender  large numbers  of environmental 
refugees.  Already  there  is  a  large  number  of  refugees  worldwide.  Many 
of  them  can  be  classed  as  environmental  refugees,  being  people  who  can 
no  longer  gain  a  secure  livelihood  in their homelands  because  of 
drought,  soil erosion,  desertification and other environmental problems. 
In their desperation they feel  they have  no  alternative but  to  seek 
sanctuary  elsewhere,  however  hazardous  the  attempt  might  be.  According 
to  latest estimates  (Jacobson,  1989),  there  are  at  least  10  million  of 
these  destitutes  today,  almost  all  in  developing  nations  and  mostly  in 
the poorest nations.  They  are people who  have  abandoned their homelands 
on a  semi-permanent basis,  having no  hope  of a  foreseeable  return.  They 
total  as  many  as  all other  refugees  (political,  religious,  racial) 
combined.  The  figure  of  10  million is certainly on  the  low  side,  since 
governments  generally  take  little official  account  of 
unconventional category  of refugees. 
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To  put  the  figure  of 10  million in perspective,  recall that at  the 
end  of  World  War  II there  were  roughly  8  million homeless  people 
wandering  around  Europe.  But  while  the  present  human  tragedy  is 
unprecedented,  it is  trifling as  compared  with  what  could well  lie 
ahead.  A possible  scenario  for  Egypt  is  indicative.  The  River  Nile 
currently  supports  a  10-km.  wide  strip of  farmlands  plus  the  delta 
plain,  totalling  40,000  square  kilometers  or  a  mere  4  percent  of 
national  territory.  In this  area  live  55  million people  today,  making 
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for  a  local  population density  of  almost  1400  per  square  kilometer. 
Egypt  already  has  severe  difficulty  in  feeding  itself.  But  global 
warming  will  cause  the  present  problem  to  be  compounded  by  sea-level 
rise. 
Now  consider  the  impact  of  a  one-meter  rise  in  sea  level.  While 
this  is not  anticipated till toward  the  end  of  the  next  century,  an 
equivalent  impact  could arrive  much  sooner  due  to  long-term  and  rapid 
subsidence  in the  Nile delta area.  The  result could well  be  that  the 
delta plain will be  permanently  flooded  as  much  as  30  kilometers  inland. 
As  a  further  result,  saltwater would  intrude  much  further  up  the  Nile's 
course.  Overall  upshot:  Egypt  could  lose  one-fifth  of  its habitable 
land and much  of its primary breadbasket.  Ten million people  now  live in 
that  sector of  the  delta that  is  only  one  meter  above  high  tide.  It is 
not unrealistic  to anticipate  that  sea-level  rise will  displace  as  many 
as  20  million people  (allowing for population growth as  well)  within the 
foreseable  future  (Milliman et al.,  1989).  This  prognosis,  moreover,  is 
cautious  and  conservative.  There  will  be  additional  problems  such  as 
intrusion of  saltwater  up  the  foreshortened  Nile,  which  will  further 
reduce  the  irrigated  lands  that  support  virtually  the  whole  of  Egypt's 
agriculture. 
Further afield,  sea-level  rise  could  eventually  cause  the 
displacement  of  120  million  people  in  Bangladesh,  100  million  in  other 
delta zones,  and  40  million in more  extended coastal  zones,  plus  23 
million  in  small-island nations  (Jacobson,  1989;  Myers,  1993;  United 
Nations  Environment  Programme,  1989).  The  total  is  more  than  300 
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million people.  Not  all of  them  would  try to  seek  sanctuary  in Europe, 
since  closer  refuge  may  be  available  in  e.g.  North  America  and 
Australia.  But  the portents  are  plain and  daunting.  In addition  there 
would  surely  be  many  more  millions  fleeing  from  greenhouse-derived 
dislocations  for agriculture,  two  of the worst hit regions  (so  far as  we 
can  discern  from  climate  models  with  their  many  uncertainties)  being 
North Africa and  sub-Saharan Africa. 
These,  then,  are  some  estimates  of  the  numbers  of  environmental 
refugees  that  may  become  an  everyday  part  of  our  future  world.  Of 
course,  the  estimates  are  very  much  a  case  of  "best  judgement" 
guesstimates--exploratory  at  most.  Some  of  them  could  be  off  target  by 
tens  of millions.  Albeit  rough  and  ready,  they  supply  an  initial 
insight into the  size of the  upcoming  problem of environmental  refugees. 
Not  so uncertain is the  consequence  for  the  European Community,  for 
other  developed  nations  too.  Aside  from  efforts  to  seal  off  the 
Community's  borders,  one  should bear in mind  too  that the  refugees  would 
feel  justified in seeking  sanctuary  in developed nations  on  the  grounds 
that it would  be  the  latter nations  that  would  have  largely  set  up  the 
problem of the  greenhouse  effect. 
No  doubt  about it,  the  repercussions  would  be  profound  (Loescher 
and  Monahan,  1989).  As  sometimes  perceived by  host nations,  refugees 
arrive  with  "unwanted  luggage"  in  the  form  of  alien  customs,  religious 
practices  and eating habits,  plus  new  pathogens  and  susceptibility to 
local pathogens.  Resettlement is generally difficult,  full assimilation 
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is  rare.  Economic  and  social dislocations  would  proliferate,  cultural 
and  ethnic  problems  would  multiply,  and  the  political  fallout  would  be 
extensive  if not  explosive.  We  are  all  too  familiar  with  the  strains 
generated  for  host  nations  when  they  have  to  face  hordes  of  refugees 
fleeing  from  drought,  famine,  floods  and  other disasters.  To  cite  a 
former  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees,  Prince  Saddrudhin 
Aga  Khan,  present  refugees  form  "a  perfect  recipe  for  widespread  human 
suffering,  social disorder and political instability." 
Yet  our experience  to date will prove  a  pale portent of what  lies 
ahead.  Thus  far  refugees  have  been viewed  as  a  peripheral  concern,  a 
kind  of aberration  from  the  normal  way  of  things.  In  the  world  of  the 
future,  they are  likely to become  a  predominant  feature  of our one-Earth 
landscape.  It requires  a  leap  of  the  imagination to  envisage  hundreds 
of  millions  of  refugees  thronging  the  world.  Yet  amid  the  din  of 
international  debate  on  climate  change,  we  hear all  too  little about 
environmental  refugees.  Few  people,  let alone  political  leaders,  think 
much  about  the  emergent  problem  in  its  full  scope--even  though  the 
Community  already pays  about  $6  billion  (in welfare  outlays  and  the 
like)  a  year  to  accomodate  the  new  arrivals--or  27  percent  of  what  the 
Community  now  supplies  in foreign aid. 
97 ( 
Appendix  8 
LEADING  ENVIRONMENTAL  SECTORS:  DETAILED  ASSESSMENTS 
1.  Soil Erosion 
It is  roughly  reckoned that agricultural  lands  are  losing topsoil 
at a  rate of  24  billion tonnes  per year above  the natural  formation  rate 
(Brown  and Wolf,  1984;  see also Pimentel,  1992).  This  is equivalent to 
all the  topsoil on the  extensive wheat-growing  lands  in Australia.  Were 
erosion  to  continue  at  the  present  rate,  there  would  be  little topsoil 
left  on  most  agricultural  lands  by  the  middle  of  next  century.  Of 
course  the  pattern is  far  from  equally  distributed,  and  many  localities 
have  already lost much  of their topsoil.  The  costs  to  soil fertility 
and  hence  to  agricultural  production  are  high:  unchecked  erosion  could 
well  cause  a  decline  of almost  30  percent  in food  output  from  rainfed 
croplands  during the  25  years  from  1985  to 2010  (Sfeir-Younis,  1986). 
The  problem is  due~ to several factors  apart  from  population growth, 
notably  poverty.  Impoverished  peasants  cannot  afford  the  conservation 
measures  needed  to protect soil cover.  But  in many  areas,  population 
growth  serves  to  induce  farmers  to  over-use  and  even  exhaust  the  soil. 
The  shrinking size of  land holdings  in many  areas  of  the  developing 
world--a factor  leading to over-loading of croplands--is  a  direct result 
of  rapid  population  growth  (combined  with  poor  agricultural  practices, 
lack of  rural infrastructure  and  other non-population factors).  In 
Nepal,  for  instance,  a  nation  where  farmsteads  are  already  small  and 
steep  slopes  are  specially prone  to  soil erosion,  the  population  growth 
rate  remains  high,  2.5  percent  per year,  resulting  in constant division 
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of  farmsteads  into ever-smaller plots.  The  average  size of upland  farms 
has  been  reduced  from  over  3  hectares  30  years  ago  to  barely  1  hectare 
today.  In the  over-crowded plains  along  the  Indian border,  farms  are  so 
tiny  (many  only one  third of a  hectare  or less)  that many  farmers  can no 
longer  make  a  living  from  the  land.  This  forces  them  to  open  up 
marginal  lands  on  steep  slopes,  thus  spreading  the  problem  of  soil 
erosion. 
2.  Desertification 
An  even  more  severe  form  of  land  degradation,  desertification 
threatens  45  million square kilometres  or  a  full  one  third of Earth's 
land  surface.  It also  undermines  the  livelihoods  of  at  least  850 
million people,  with costs  in terms  of agricultural output  foregone 
exceeding  $30  billion per  year.  At  least  60,000  sq.  kms.  of 
agricultural land are  eliminated  through this  cause  each year,  and 
another  200,000  square kilometres  are  impoverished,  resulting in reduced 
yields  and  requiring costly  remedial  measures  (Dregne  and  Tucker,  1988; 
Mabbutt,  1984).  As  in the  case  of  soil  erosion,  desertification  stems 
in part  from  faulty  agricultural  policies,  lack  of  extension  services, 
inadequate  attention  to  subsistence  agriculture,  peverse  pricing 
practices,  inadequate  credit  and  marketing  facilities,  and  over-
regulation on  the  part of  governments  among  other deleterious  factors 
(Blaikie,  1985). 
But  population pressures play  a  salient part as well.  Population 
growth  is  generally higher  in  semi-arid  and  arid  lands  than  elsewhere. 
In over half ot  the  34  predominantly  dry  countries  (those  in which  more 
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than  three-quarters  of  total  area  is  dry),  population  growth  has 
remained at 3  percent or more  since  the  mid-1970s  (Grainger,  1990). 
The  two  issues  treated here,  soil erosion and  desertification,  are 
the  main  forms  of  land  degradation  in  developing  nations.  In principle, 
it would  be  possible  through  improved  agricultural  policies,  agro-
technologies  and  the  like,  to  safeguard  the  food  resource  base,  even  to 
make  it still more  productive.  But  the  experience  of  the  1980s,  when 
population  growth  became  an  ever-more  prominent  factor,  shows  that 
agricultural  lands  have  been  deteriorating  and  per-capita  food 
production declining in much  of  Southern Asia,  sub-Saharan Africa  and 
the  Andean  nations.  Agronomic  strategies  assume  stability in  the 
environmental  state of the  resource base,  whereas  the  reverse is true in 
many  agricultural zones.  There  are all too  few  instances  where  new 
technologies  for soil conservation  and  crop  management  have  kept  pace 
with  the  demands  of  fast-growing  human  numbers.  On  the  contrary, 
productive  capacity  has  been  declining  steadily  in entire  regions.  As 
for  the  future,  the  prospect  is  that  sub-Saharan Africa's  already  over-
burdened  lands  will  need  to  support  an  extra  755  million  people  by  the 
year  2025  (155  percent  more),  and  India's  an  extra  507  million  (59 
percent more). 
Land  degradation hits  hardest  at  those  least  capable  of 
withstanding it,  the  world's  "bottom  billion"  poorest  people--precisely 
those  who  often  cause  most  land  degradation  (as  a  consequence  of  their 
poverty),  and  precisely  those  who  generally  feature  the  highest 
fertility  rates.  Thus  the  land  degradation  problem will  keep  on  being 
100 compounded  by  the  predominant  and  most  persistent  factor  of  all, 
population growth. 
3.  Water Deficits 
Water  consumption has  doubled  twice  this  century,  and  demand  could 
well  double  again during  the next  two  decades,  primarily because  of 
population growth  (Falkenmark  and  Suprapto,  1992).  Yet  in 88  developing 
nations with  40  percent  of the  world's  population,  water deficits  are 
(  already a  serious constraint on agriculture,  industry and public health; 
at least  2  billion people  suffer chronic  deficits  (Falkenmark,  1990  and 
1991;  Falkenmark  and Chapman,  1989;  la Riviere,  1989).  How  much  this is 
due  to population growth  in itself is difficult to  determine,  because 
advancing  technology often  feeds  demand  while  also offering  scope  for 
repeated  re-use  of  what  should  be  an  intrinsically  renewable  resource. 
But  in general  terms,  there  is  a  sizeable  contribution  from  population 
growth in conjunction with  lack of  socioeconomic  infrastructure. 
According  to pioneering analysis  by  Falkenmark  (1990  and 1991),  a 
society  typically  experiences  "water  stress"  when  the  number  of  people 
competing  for each annual  "flow unit"  of 1  million cubic meters  of water 
reaches  2000,  or  500  cubic  meters  per  person.  After  this  point,  it is 
almost certain there will be  inherent water-deficit problems,  often 
acute  scarcity and  even  outright  shortages.  In  fact,  many  developing 
nations  with  inadequate  socioeconomic  infrastructure  find  the  "water 
barrier"  level  comes  into play  when  only  1000  people  compete  for  each 
flow unit. 
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By  the  end  of this  decade,  most  nations  of North Africa,  a  region 
of  special  interest  to  the  European  Community,  also  of East  Africa,  are 
projected to  exceed  the  2000-person measure  of  scarcity,  five  of  them 
having  less  than  1000  cubic  meters  of  water  per  person.  Most  of  these 
nations have  annual population growth  rates  exceeding  2.5 percent.  This 
opens  up  scope  for  a  "risk  spiral"  concerning  water  supplies 
(Falkenmark,  1989).  Driven  by  population  growth  and  fuelled  by  hydro-
climatic  factors  of  arid-land  environments  (the  one  reinforces  the 
other's  impact),  the  phenomenon  of  accelerating  water  shortages  argues 
for greater attention to be  directed at a  resource-scarcity problem that 
could eventually match established shortages of food  and energy. 
4.  Tropical Deforestation 
Tropical moist forests  are  expected to lose  almost  150,000  square 
kilometres  of their expense  during  1992.  This  will  amount  to  roughly  2 
percent  of  remaining  forests,  and  will  constitute  an  annual 
deforestation rate almost  twice  as  large as  of 1980  (Myers,  1992b). 
How  much  tropical  deforestation can  be  attributed to  population 
growth?  According  to  an  exploratory  and  illuminating  assessment 
(Harrison,  1992),  the  amount  is  79  percent,  the  other  21  percent  being 
attributable  to  factors  such  as  increase  in  agricultural  expansion  due 
to  enhanced per-capita  food  consumption.  Based  on  a  speculative  rather 
than  a  conclusive calculation,  the analysis  demonstrates  that population 
growth is the  predominant  factor in tropical deforestation. 
102 Note,  moreover,  that almost  three-fifths of present deforestation 
is  due  to  the  slash-and-burn cultivator.  He  manifests  himself not  so 
much  as  a  shifting  cultivator  of  tradition  (practising  a  self-renewing 
mode  of  forest  exploitation),  but  as  a  shifted cultivator,  or  displaced 
peasant,  viz.  a  smallscale  farmer  who  finds  himself  landless  in 
traditional  agricultural  territories  and  feels  himself  obliged  to 
~igrate to  the  last unoccupied public  lands  available,  the  forests. 
Populations  of  these  shifted cultivators  are  usually  increasing  at 
(  annual  rates  far  above  the  rates  for  nation-wide  increase  (Bilsborrow, 
~987;  Lynch,  1990;  Myers,  1989;  Peters  and  Neunschwander,  1988;  Schuman 
and  Partridge,  1989;  Thiesenhusen,  1989).  The  best  known  case  is  that 
of Rondonia,  Brazil,  where  the  numbers  of  smallscale  settlers  increased 
at  a  rate  that  surpassed  15  percent per year  for  much  of  the  period 
1975-87,  whereas  the population growth  rate for all Brazil averaged  only 
2.1  percent  (Malingreau  and  Tucker,  1988).  There  are  similar mass 
migrations  into tropical  forests,  albeit with  lower  rates  of population 
increase,  in  Ecuador,  Peru,  Bolivia,  Ivory  Coast,  Nigeria,  India, 
Thailand,  Vietnam,  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines.  In  all  these 
instances,  population  growth  is  a  significant  if not  the  predominant 
factor  in deforestation. 
But  one  must  be  careful not  to over-simplify  the  situation.  A host 
of  related factors  frequently  operate  in addition  to  population  growth. 
They  include  pervasive  poverty  among  peasant  communities, 
maldistribution  of  traditional  farmlands,  inequitable  land-tenure 
systems,  ineffecient  agricultural  technologies,  insufficient  political 
emphasis  on  subsistence  farming,  lack  of  rural  infrastructure,  and 
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faulty  development policies overall.  In Brazil,  for  instance,  5  percent 
of  farmland  owners  possess  70  percent of all farmlands,  while  70  percent 
cultivate  only  5  percent  of  farmlands--an  increasingly  skewed  situation 
that  fosters  landlessness  on  the  part of peasant  farmers.  In addition, 
a  further 1.7 million Brazilians  enter  the  job market  each year,  over 
half of  them  failing  to  find  enough  employment  to  support  themselves, 
many  of  them  joining  the  forest-bound  migrants  in  search  of  land  and 
livelihood. 
There  is  much  scope  in future  population  growth  for  still larger 
throngs  of shifted cultivators to accelerate deforestation.  By  the year 
2030,  80  percent of the world's  projected population of  more  than  8 
billion people  are  expected  to  be  living  in  tropical  forest  nations. 
This  translates  into  6.4 billion people,  1  billion more  than  exist 
today.  Given  the  demographic  momentum  built  into  processes  of 
population  growth,  and  even  allowing  for  expanded  family-planning 
programs,  population  projections  suggest  that  in  those  nations  where 
economies  appear  to  likely  to  remain  primarily  agrarian,  there  will  be 
progressive  pressures  on  remaining  forests,  extending  for  decades  into 
the  future.  For instance,  Ecuador's population is projected to increase 
from  12  million today  to  24  million before it attains  zero  growth  in 
about  a  century's  time;  Cameroon's  from  11 million  to  67  million;  Ivory 
Coast's  from  13  million  to  83  million;  Madagascar's  from  12  million  to 
49  million;  Myanmar's  from  42  million to  97  million;  Indonesia's  from 
181  million to  345  million;  and  Vietnam's  68  to  168  million.  Unless 
there  is  a  marked  reduction  in  population  growth,  together  with 
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resolution  of  the  landless-peasant  phenomenon  (a  prospect  that  appears 
less  than  promising  (Sinha,  1984)),  it is  difficult  to  see  that  much 
forest will  remain  in just a  few  decades'  time  in most  of  the  nations 
cited. 
5.  Mass  Extinction of Species 
Of  Earth's  estimated stock of  35  million  species  (the  actual  total 
could be  rather smaller or  a  good  deal  larger),  some  30  million are 
believed  to  exist  in  tropical  forests  (Erwin,  1988).  So  the  mass 
extinction of  species  underway  is  largely  located  in  tropical  forests, 
which,  as  we  have  just  seen,  are  being  eliminated at  ever-more  rapid 
rates.  Various  analyses  (Ehrlich and Wilson,  1991;  Myers,  1990b;  Raven, 
1988;  Wilson,  1992)  indicate we  could witness  the  demise  of  several 
million species  by  the year  2000,  and conceivably as  many  as half of all 
species within the  longer-term future. 
According to a  summary  calculation  (based upon Wilson,  1989),  the 
1992  tropical deforestation rate  of almost  2  percent per year  implies 
that population growth  (which,  as  we  have  noted,  accounts  for  79  percent 
of annual  deforestation)  causes  a  species  loss  of almost  0.4 percent per 
year.  If there  are  30  million  species  in tropical  forests,  this  works 
out at almost  120,000  species per year.  Tentative as  this latter figure 
is,  it is  offered  for  the  purpose  of  shedding  preliminary  light  on 
population growth's  contribution to mass  extinction.  Note  too  that 
according  to  some  recent  calculations,  as  much  as  4.5  million  square 
kilometres  of  wildlife  habitat  will  have  to  be  converted  to  human 
purposes  by  2050  in order to  feed  growing  populations  and  cater for 
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rising nutritional  levels  under  the  medium  population projection  (for 
the  high projection,  6.5 million  square kilometres,  and  for  the  low 
projection,  3.3  million  square  kilometres)·  (United  Nations  Environment 
Programme,  1990).  For  comparison,  the  world's  protected  areas  in  1990 
totalled 6.5 million square kilometres. 
6.  Ultra-Rapid Urban Growth 
Population growth  expresses  itself not  only  in sheer  increase  in 
human  numbers  but  in distribution patterns.  Increasingly  they  are 
concentrated in urban areas.  In 1950,  only  29  percent  of humankind  was 
urbanized,  but  today  the  proportion is  approaching  50  percent.  By  far 
the  greatest  part  of  this  urbanization  trend  is  taking  place  in 
developing nations,  where  urban  populations  are  projected to  surge  from 
a  total of  around 1.5 billion people  today  to  well  over  4  billion by 
2025--by which  time  developing nations  will  be  almost  as  urbanized  as 
developed  nations  (Brown  and  Jacobson,  1987;  Hardoy  and  Satterthwaite, 
1989).  This  makes  for  one  of  the  most  extreme  demographic  phenomena 
since people  started to gather in urban communities  5000  years  ago. 
There  is  some  benefit in urbanization in developing nations  from 
the  population  growth  standpoint.  City  dwelling  people  have  smaller 
families;  there  is no  need  to  have  large  numbers  of  children  to  help 
till farm  fields.  It gets  people  off  the  land;  as  long  as  rural  areas 
have  to  support  over-large  communities,  there  is  soil  erosion, 
desertification,  deforestation and degradation of watersheds. 
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overcrowding.  While  Chicago  has  only  around  2500  people  per  square 
kilometre,  and  London  4000,  Cairo  ~as 24,000,  Mexico  City 34,000,  Manila 
43,000  and Calcutta 88,000  (United Nations  Centre  for Human  Settlements, 
1987).  The  environment  and  development  repercussions  are  profound,  as 
urban authorities  try to  provide  infrastructure  and  basic  services  such 
as  housing,  energy,  water,  sewage  disposal,  transportation  and  general 
utilities  (Drakakis-Smith,  1987;  Hardoy  and  Satterthwaite,  1990).  Vast 
throngs  of  people  subsist  on  the  margins  of  survival  (Lowe,  1991).  At 
least  1.2  billion people,  or  60  percent  of  developing-nation  city 
dwellers,  live in squatter settlements,  often shantytowns  fashioned  from 
cardboard,  plastic,  canvas  or whatever other material is available.  The 
number  of urban households  without  safe water  increased from  138  million 
to 1970  to  215  million in 1988  (a  56-percent  increase in just 18  years), 
and  that of  those without  adequate  sanitation rose  from  98  million to 
340  million  (247  percent)  (Cairncross  et al.,  1990;  Hardoy  and 
Satterthwaite,  1989). 
Much  of  this urbanization trend and  the  extreme  squalor it 
engenders  can  be  attributed  to  population  growth.  True,  other  factors 
are  at  work,  such  as  misguided  policies  for  urban  planning,  especially 
in  the  form  of  outmoded  building  regulations.  But  population  growth 
must  be  counted  the  principal  factor.  As  far  back  as  the  1970s,  urban 
communities  had  to  accommodate  another  30  million people  each year--a 
challenge  that  plainly  exceeded  the  planning  capacities  of  governments. 
During  the  1990s,  the  total could well be  twice  as  many,  and  by  2025  it 
could  reach  90  million  each  year. 
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NATURAL  RESOURCE  ACCOUNTING 
Natural  resouce  accounting  (NRA}  entails  a  radical  revision of  the 
way  in which  governments  assess  the  state of their economies.  To  date, 
our  economic  accountancy  procedures  fail  to  reflect  our  use,  or  rather 
mis-use  and  over-use,  of  environmental  resources.  National  budgets  and 
other  annual  audits  rarely  consider  the  depletion  of  environmental 
resources,  nor  do  they portray  the  decline  in goods  and  services  that 
these  resources  generate.  So  while  we  hear much  about  rates  of economic 
growth,  we  hear all too  little,  in equally  systematized  form  at  least, 
about  rates  of  environmental  resource  depletion.  This  discrepancy 
between  the  way  we  appraise  our  economic  activities,  and  the  way  we 
evaluate  the  state of  the  environmental-resource  base  that ultimately 
sustains  economic  activity,  leads  to  a  grossly  distorted view  of  our 
economic health  (Folke  and Kaberger,  1991;  Lutz  and El  Serafy,  1988}. 
When  we  make  use  of  human-made  assets  such  as  equipment  and 
buildings,  we  write off our use  as  depreciation.  But  we  do  not view our 
environment  as  productive capital,  even  though  we  utilize it as  such. 
When  we  excessively exploit  forests,  over-work  croplands  until  the  soil 
erodes,  and  use  our  skies  as  a  free  garbage  can  and  our  rivers  as  cost-
less  sewers,  our  income  as  revealed  via  GNP  actually  registers  an 
increase.  When  we  engage  in efforts  to  reduce  or  repair  the  damage, 
those  economic  activities are also  regi~tered as  additions  to  GNP. 
108 In the United States,  for  instance,  GNP  has  registered an  almost 
continuous  rise  for  many  decades.  But  NRA  reveals  that  an  alternative 
measure,  "sustainable economic  welfare"  (Daly  and  Cobb,  1989),  flattened 
out  in the  late  1960s  and has  registered  a  slight decline  since  the 
early 1980s.  If  we  continue  to  ignore  the  goods  and  services  of 
environmental  resources,  we  may  drive  the  sustainable  economy  down  even 
while  GNP  rises:  this  will  be  the  consequence  of  treating  the 
environment  and  economics  as  not  only  separate  sectors  but  as  polar 
opposites. 
In short,  NRA  would  correct  the partial accounting  system  employed 
at present,  with its misleading  signals  for  use  of  the  environmental-
resource  stocks  that ultimately underpin all economies.  Being  a  policy 
intervention of comprehensive  scope,  it would quickly start to generate a 
plethora of accurate messages  as  concerns  our  legitimate  use  of  the 
environmental-resource  base.  In  turn,  policy  makers  would  soon  find 
they had little option but to  engage  in a  whole  series  of  adjustments 
when  evaluating  their policies,  programmes,  projects  and  other 
activities.  The  immediate  knock-on  effects  would  be  significant  and 
widespread,  and  would  speedily  generate  their own  multiplier effects. 
As  a  high-leverage  intervention,  NRA  would  engender  linkages  thinking 
throughout  environment  and  development  spheres alike. 
A policy measure  parallel to  NRA  lies with adjustment  of  those 
pricing  policies  that  likewise  send  out  perverse  messages  about 
sustainable  use  of  environmental  resources  because  they  do  not  reflect 
all  costs  of  production.  The  adjustment  strategy  is  sometimes  known  as 
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internalize  the  many  externalities  of  fos~il-fuel burning,  perhaps 
through a  carbon tax to reflect acid rain,  C02  emissions  and other  forms 
of pollution.  We  would  then be  obliged to pay  a  price  for  fossil  fuels 
that reflect all costs  entailed.  The  price  of  a  litre of petrol might 
well  double  in  European  countries  (and  increase  much- more  in  North 
America). 
The  result would  be  to  induce massive  shifts in our perception of 
the  role  of  (formerly  cheap)  petrol in our  economies,  and  to  bring  an 
end  to  the  semi-free  ride  we  currently enjoy.  Car  transportation would 
swifly  decline,  with  a  concomitant  shift  to  public  transport  systems 
that,  reflecting  suddenly  expanded  demand,  would  be  enhanced  by  both 
official and private bodies.  In turn,  there  could  emerge  a  trend for 
the business  sector to  relocate its facilities  in the direction of where 
workers  live,  instead of  requiring workers  to  take polluting trips  to 
work  each day.  The  ramifications would  ripple  throughout our economies, 
our  societies,  and  our  understanding  of  our  status  vis-a-vis  our 
environment-support base.  The  process  would  foster linkages  thinking in 
abundant  ways,  whether on  the part of policy makers,  business  leaders  or 
private citizens.  In other words,  we  would  find ourselves  obliged to 
think again not  only  when  we  visit the  petrol  station but  when  we  visit 
the  supermarket--indeed  at  dozens  of  points  in our  daily  lives.  The 
overall effect would  be  to incorporate  environmental values  right across 
the  economic  system,  and to do  it in systemic  fashion. 
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a  number  of  related  measures  such  as  fiscal  incentives  and 
disincentives,  adaption  of  discount  rates,  establishment  of 
environmental  indicators,  and  implementation  of  the  precautionary 
principle  and  the  polluter pays  principle  (for detailed discussion,  see 
for  example  Pearce et al.,  1989  and  1991) 
These  various  policy  interventions  would  require  a  radical 
reorientation in shift policy makers'  outlook  from  their erstwhile  mode 
of  linear  thinking,  i.e.  non-linkages  thinking.  Attitudes  and 
perceptions  are  deeply  entrenched  in  myriad  ways,  inducing  an 
institutional inertia in virtually all spheres  of  human  activity.  This 
inertia  factor  is  a  super-powerful  force  (though  a  new  form  of  inertia 
can  work  to  our benefit when  once  the  corrective  measures  are  in place, 
generating  a  constructive  form  of  momentum).  The  longer  we  delay  in 
adopting corrective measures,  the  more  deeply  the  present patterns  of 
activity will  become  entrenched. 
111 Appendix  10 
GRANDSCALE  TREE  PLANTING  TO  OFFSET  CARBON  DIOXIDE  EMISSIONS 
The  Netherlands  government  plans  to  engage  in  extensive 
reforestation in  that  part  of  the  world  where  trees  put  on  biomass 
fastest,  the  humid  tropics,  and specifically in several nations  of Latin 
America.  The  purpose  is to offset carbon dioxide  emissions  from  two  new 
Dutch  coal-burning  power  plants.  Tree  planting  costs  in  2500  square 
kilometres  of  Latin  America  will  be  only  8  percent  as  much  as  in 
Netherlands;  and  Netherlands  would  be  able to counterbalance  only  1 
percent  of  its  carbon  dioxide  emissions  if it were  to  reforest  10 
percent of its national territory,  more  than doubling its forest estate. 
A  more  productive  response  of course  would  be  for Netherlands  to 
engage  in stringent  cutbacks  in its carbon dioxide  emissions,  enough  to 
obviate  the  need  for  tree  planting measures  overseas.  The  nation  is 
instituting a  substantial carbon tax,  but this will not be nearly enough 
to eliminate its carbon dioxide  contribution to  global warming. 
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124 WORLD  POPULATION  GROWTH 
(medium  projections) 
PoJ2!!lation  1991  Growth Rate  Po;eulation Projections  Per-Ca;eita GNP 
(billions)  (annual  %)  2000  2025  2100  1989  (US  $) 
(billions) 
World  5.4  1.7  6.3  8.6  11.6  3,760 
Developed  Nations  1.2  0.5  1.3  1.4  1.5  16,990 
Developing  Nations  4.2  2.1  5.0  7.2  10.1  750 
European Community  0.35  0.2  0.35  0.36  0.35  14,079 
Source:  McNamara,  1991;  United  Nations  Population  Division,  1991;  World  Bank,  1991  and 
1992. Table g 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY:  POPULATION  DATA 
Nation  PoEulation  ~~  PoEulation Projections  Per-CaEita  Po:eulation 
1991  (annual  %)  2000  2025  2100  GNP  1989  £!!. .!S:..  km. 
(US$) 
Germany  79.5  -0.1  78  72  61  16,200  1494 
Italy  57.7  0.1  58  58  58  15,150  1284 
United Kingdom  57.5  0.2  57  58  59  14,750  1577 
France  56.7  0.4  58  61  62  17,830  694 
Spain  39.0  0.2  43  48  51  9,150  518 
Netherlands  15.0  0.4  15  15  15  16,010  2704 
Portugal  10.4  0.2  11  11  11  4,260  756 
Greece  10.1  0.1  10  10  10  5,340  510 
Belgium  9.9  0.1  10  10  10  16,390  2180 
Denmark  5.1  0.0  5  5  5  20,510  800 
Ireland  3.5  0.6  4  5  6  8,500  334 
Luxembourg  0.4  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.4  24,860  1012 
European Community  345  0.2  349  363  348  14,079 
Developed nations  1,219  0.5  1,274  1,412  1,457  16,990 
Developing nations  4,165  2.1  5,018  7,234  10,112  750 
World  5,384  1.7  6,292  8,645  11,569  3,760 
Sources:  McNamara,  1991;  Population Reference Bureau,  1991;  World Bank,  1991  and  1992 !
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 Population 1991  (millions) 
--growth rate,  % 
--annual increase  1991  (millions) 
GNP  1989  (US  $) 
--per capita 
Under-5 Mortality 1990  (per  1000) 
Daily Calorie Supply,  % 
of need  1985 
Exports/Imports Ratio  1987 
--Terms  of Trade  1987  (1980 
Arable Land per Capita,  Has. 
Primary Energy Use  1989 
--total (PJ) 
--per capita  (GJ) 
--total fossil-fuel use  (PJ) 
--average annual increase in 
energy use  1984-89  (%) 
Total 002  Emissions  from Fossil 
Fuels  1987  (mill.  tonnes  C) 
--per capita  (tonnes C) 
100) 
All Greenhouse Gases  (mill.  tonnes 
C  equivalent)  1987 
--per capita  (tonnes C  equivalent) 
HUMAN  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  INDICATORS 
Developed Nations 
1,219 
0.5 
6.1 
15.2 trillion 
16,990 
12 
132 
0.79 
103 
1.5 
247,630 
205 
215,746 
1.9 
3,900 
3.2 
3,200 
2.6 
Developing Nations 
4,165 
2.1 
87.5 
5.0 trillion 
750 
70 
107 
0.96 
83 
0.7 
87,870 
22 
78,842 
5.7 
1,600 
0.4 
2,400 
0.6 
5,384 
1.7 
91.5 
20.2 trillion 
3,760 
63 
113 
0.87 
86 
0.8 
335,500 
63 
294,588 
2.8 
5,500 
1.0 
5,600 
1.1 
Sources:  United Nations  Development  Programme,  1990;  World Resources  Institute,  1992;  World Bank,  1992 ~~ 
GREENHOUSE  GAS  EMISSIONS,  1987 
~  ~  GHG  Carbon Dioxide  Methane  CFCs  Per-CaEita 
Emissions  (mill.  tonnes)  (mill.  tonnes)  (mill.  tonnes)  GBG  Emissions 
(mill.  tonnes  (tonnes C.) 
c.)  (&  % of 
world total) 
Germany  (W  & E)  201.2  (3.6)  300.0  4.2  0.06  3.3 
United Kingdom  160.3  (2.9)  170.0  4.3  0.05  2.8 
Italy  101.4  (1. 8)  110.0  2.2  0.05  1.7 
France  100.0  (1.8)  96.0  2.8  0.05  1.8 
Spain  49.9  (0.9)  57.0  1.7  0.035  1.3 
Netherlands  43.6  (0.8)  36.0  1.3  0.013  3.0 
Belgium  28.6  (0.5)  28.0  0.5  0.009  2.9 
Greece  16.3  (0.3)  20.0  0.4  0.009  1.6 
Portugal  7.8  (0.1)  9.7  0.4  0.009  0.8 
Denmark  16.7  (0.3)  17.0  0.3  0.005  3.3 
Ireland  8.1  (0.1)  8.8  0.5  0.003  2.3 
Luxembourg  2.4  (0.04)  2.6  0.01  n/a  6.5 
EC  Total  736.2  (13.2)  855.1  18.6  0.3  2.3 
For  comparison: 
USA  1213.9  (21. 7)  1214  40.0  0.2  5.0 
Note:  It is  roughly  reckoned  that  carbon  dioxide  contributes  49  percent  to  global  warming, 
methane  18 percent,  nitrous oxide  6  percent,  CFCs  15 percent and ozone  12 percent. 
Source:  World Resources  Institute,  1992 CFC  PRODUCTION  BY  LEADING  EC  NATIONS,  1987 
Nation  Tonnes  !  of Global 
Total 
France  140,000  11.8 
United Kingdom  130,000  11.0 
West  Germany  125,000  10.6 
Netherlands  77,000  6.5 
Italy  76,000  6.4 
Spain  69,000  5.8 
Greece  17,000  1.4 
European Community  634,000  53.7 
United States  450,000  38.1 
World  1,180,000  100.0 
Sources:  Benedick,  1991;  United  Nations  Environment 
Programme,  1991 OFFICIAL  DEVELOPMENT  ASSISTANCE,  1990 
Billions US$  !  of GNP 
France  9.4  0.79 
Germany  6.3  0.42 
Italy  3.4  0.32 
United Kingdom  2.6  0.27 
Netherlands  2.6  0.94 
Denmark  1.2  0.93 
Belgium  0.9  0.45 
Spain  0.6  0.16 
Portugal  0.1  0.22 
Ireland  0.06  0.16 
Greece  0.04  0.07 
European Community  total  27.2  0.5 
including aid from 
the  Commission  31.0  0.5 
USA  11.4  0.21 
Japan  9.1  0.31 
All  ODA  54.1  0.35 
Source:  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development,  1991. POPULATION  SIZE  SCENARIOS 
(millions) 
1991 Population  Ultimate Population  Ultimate Population  Difference 
Ghana  15.5 
Kenya  25.2 
Pakistan  117.5 
Nigeria  122.5 
Source:  McNamara,  1991 
if Replacement 
Fertility Achieved 
in 2010 
46 
72 
334 
341 
if Replacement 
Fertility Achieved 
in 2035 
66 
113 
556 
617 
Due  to Delay in 
Reaching Replacement 
Fertility (and !  of 
1991  population) 
20  (133) 
41  ( 171) 
222  (193) 
276  (232) 